

HISTORY OF ETHICS TO 1900

USC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
Philosophy 442
History of Ethics to 1900

Spring 2001
3:30-4:45PM MW, Mudd Hall of Philosophy 7B
Instructor: Dallas Willard

A. This is a course in the History of Philosophical Ethics, or Ethical Theory, and it has as its main aim thoroughly to familiarize the student with most of the main arguments and analyses concerning ethical issues advanced by Western moral philosophers up to 1900.

Because of the vast area to be covered, there will be a large amount of reading to be done, most of it in primary sources. But the passages to be concentrated upon are more manageable in the time we have available. These passages are the ones that will be dealt with in the meetings of the class. At the meetings there will often be stated or distributed study questions and/or outlines bearing upon the reading to be done for the next class meeting. Responses to these should be carefully prepared for that next meeting, in written notes so far as possible.

The student might best approach this course as a "Great Books" or "Great Authors" study, where the primary task is to understand the ethical views of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hobbes, Butler, Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick, along with a number of lesser figures.

From the lecturer's point of view, the material of the course is viewed as a dialectical stream proceeding from Pre-Socratic Greece to the England of 1900, in which the recurring antitheses are: "The Good" as something specifically human (Protagoras, Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Mill) and "The Good" as something transcendental to human nature (Plato, Clark, Price, Kant, and--in the early 20th Century--G. E. Moore).

B. The formal requirements of the course are:--two take home examinations, and a two-hour final. Several one-page "thought papers" or "precis" will be assigned. Graduate students must, in addition, prepare a 15 page critical essay--not a research paper--on a central topic in either, Aristotle, Kant or Hume. This essay is due at 7 pm on May 2, but must be discussed with the instructor by April 11th, and a preliminary draft/outline submitted by April 25th. The final exam presupposes a detailed knowledge of texts read from Aristotle, Kant, and Sidgwick's Methods, as well as all of the material studied after the 2nd mid-term. Two thirds of the final will be on these three authors. Class attendance, preparedness for recitation, and regular participation in the class discussions are expected from

all members of the class.

(If the class is over 25 in number and we have a Teaching Assistant, a precis will be required every two weeks, and the week after each is due a one-hour discussion sections will be arranged--most likely, one in the hour before the lecture on Tuesday and one in the hour after, to fit everyone in.

Attendance at these will be required. Anyone with a grade of "A" (not "A-") on all precis after the first one will be excused from the final (assigned an "A" for it). **Note: this is all entirely hypothetical and depends on whether or not there is a teaching assistant.**

A "precis" will answer four questions with respect to the passage assigned: 1. What is the problem the author is trying to solve. 2. What is the solution or answer arrived at? 3. What are the reasons given for the solution? 4. Is the solution or answer reached based on true assumptions or premisses, and is the reasoning from those premisses valid?

A "precis" <described in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1981) as "a concise summary of the essential facts or statements of a book or article, or other text"> will, for this course, be **no more than two pages long**, and will not try to "get" everything the passage says or covers. It will not be a summary in that sense. Rather, it will attempt to state and evaluate **the essential line of reasoning** in the passage, as is indicated by the four questions above.)

C. TEXTS:

1. Melden, A. I., Ethical Theories
2. Sidgwick, Henry, Outlines of the History of Ethics>
3. D. D. Raphael, British Moralists, two volumes
4. Darwall, S., The British Moralist and the Internal 'Ought'
5. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics.

& Numerous photocopy handouts.

On reserve for your inspection and use:

Frankena, Ethics, Selby-Bigge, L. A., ed., British Moralists, two volumes (See especially the "Introduction" in vol. I); J. B. Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: An Anthology; and A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics.

Of these texts, the Sidgwick Outlines is to be read as soon and with as much continuity as is possible. (For those without prior studies in ethical theory, this should also be done with the Frankena Ethics.) Try to do this reading the first week of the semester or so, and then re-read the corresponding parts of Outlines along with the other texts, on the schedule given below.

D. Schedule of Lecture Topics, Assigned Readings and Examinations:

Lecture I--Jan 8: Discussion of the subject matter of the course.

The nature of philosophical work in relation to historical studies. Pre-philosophical ethics (see pages 95-121 of C. S. Lewis, Abolition of Man along with Asoka, The Edicts of Asoka <both on reserve>) and the move to philosophy (Melden pp. 1-19 and MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics <hereafter "ASHOE," on reserve> 1-25). What in life calls for ethical thought? What is ethical theory?

Lecture II--Jan 10: The heart of Plato's theory in the Republic.

Readings: The selections from the Republic in Melden, pp. 20-87. Pay especial attention to 52-61 & 75-87.

(Suggested additional reading: ASHOE, pp. 26-56, and Kevin Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, chs 7-8.)

Precis #1 due Jan 20: Plato, Republic (Larson pp. 22-30 <compare Melden, pp. 38b-44b>)

University Holiday Jan 15

Lecture III--Jan 17: Some difficulties with Plato's view.

Aristotle's two main parameters: What life aims at (telos, "The Good") and the function of the human being.

Readings: Finish the Plato selections in Melden and read pp. 88-101 of The Aristotle selections. Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 22-70.

Lecture IV--Jan 22: Aristotle's theory of Virtue. A comparison the A. MacIntyre's social constructionist theory.

Readings: Aristotle (Melden) pp. 101-128.
(Suggested further reading: ASHOE pp. 57-83, and MacIntyre, After Virtue, chapters 10, 11 & 12)

Lecture V--Jan 24: The flight to 'happiness'. Aristotle's ultimate confusion: failure to unify end and function. The "failure of nerve" of Greek civilization. Adjusting the soul as the way to "the good life."

Readings: Melden (Aristotle, Epicurus, Epictetus) pp. 128-163; Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 70-108
(Suggested further reading: ASHOE pp. 84-109)

Lecture VI--Jan 29: 'Happiness' (the 'good', 'the good life') not attainable in this world. Taking evil seriously. The Christian alternative and the continuing problem with virtue: how is it related to 'happiness'?

Readings: Melden (Augustine, Aquinas), pp. 164-217
 (Suggested further reading: Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia.)

Lecture VII--Jan 31: The "two cities" and the problems of an "institutionalized" moral life or ethical theory. 'Law', and 'natural' law, as the way beyond institutionalized Christianity.

Readings: Melden, pp. 164-217 (continued), and pp. 225-231.
 Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 109-163
 (Suggested further reading: Raphael, British Moralists, Vol. I, pp. 79-102; ASHOE, PP. 110-156

Lecture VIII--Feb 5: Law and moral obligation. Moral obligation as a 'natural' reality.

Readings: Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought', pp. 1-52.
 (Suggested further reading: Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, "Introduction," pp. xxxi-xcii of Vol. I, and ASHOE, pp. 157-189.)

LECTURE IX--Feb 7: Hobbes' take on human nature, the basic moral distinctions and 'natural' law. "Naturalism" in ethical theory, and how it necessitates "Nothingbutism" (Reductionism).

Readings: Melden, pp. 218-231, Raphael, Vol. I, pp. 3-76.
 Darwall, chapter 3 (pp. 53-79). Sidgwick, pp. 163-170.

LECTURE X--Feb 12: Continuation on Hobbes. And Cumberland

Readings: Same readings and add Darwall chapter 4.

TAKE HOME EXAM HANDED OUT
 (Due at class on Feb. 21st)

LECTURE XI--Feb 14: Catch up and review.

University Holiday Feb 19

Precis #3 due Feb 17: Cudworth against Hobbes, pp. 105-top 112 of Raphael (ed), British Moralists, Vol. I.

LECTURE XII--Feb 21: The "Platonist" (Anti-"Naturalist") reaction to Hobbes--Cudworth and S. Clarke.

Readings: Raphael, Vol. I, pp. 105-134 & 191-225.
 Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 170-184. Darwall, chap. 5.

(Suggested further readings: F. J. Powicke, The Cambridge Platonists: A Study (Archon Books, 1971, 1st ed. 1926); and A. N. Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics.)

LECTURE XIII--Feb 26: The ambiguous case of John Locke, who tries to combine Empiricism (Naturalism) with Law.

Readings: Raphael, Vol. I, 137-166. Darwall, chapters 2 & 6.

LECTURE XIV--Feb 28: Continuation on Locke and the Platonists.

Readings: Finish the ones already assigned.

LECTURE XV--Mar 5: The "Sentimentalist," Empiricist response to Hobbes and the Platonists. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. The "phenomenology" of moral experience.

Readings: Raphael, Vol. I, pp. 169-188 & 261-321.
Darwall, chapters 7 & 8.

LECTURE XVI--Mar 7: "Sentimentalism" continued. The ambiguous case of Joseph Butler.

Readings: Finish those assigned for last lecture, and begin the Butler readings in Raphael (325-386) and Melden (pp. 232-272). Read Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 184-224, and Darwall chapter 9.

Spring Break

LECTURE XVII--Mar 19: "Sentimentalism" continued. Butler and Hume.

Readings: Finish the Butler readings assigned, and begin the readings in Hume, first from Raphael Vol. II, pp. 3-58 (from the Treatise) and then from Melden. pp. 273-316 (From the Enquiry).

LECTURE XVIII--Mar 21: Hume's theory. The significance of Hume and the cultural triumph of Empiricism (Naturalism).

Readings: Continue with the Hume readings assigned, and read Darwall, chapters 10 and 11.

TAKE HOME EXAM HANDED OUT
(Due at class April 2nd)

LECTURE XIX--Mar 26: Hume, and Intuitionism in reaction to him. Richard Price, Adam Smith. Intuitions and Sentiments ("Passions")--what is the difference and how are they related? What does the "impartial spectator" see?

Readings: Raphael, British Moralists, Vol. II, pp. 131-198.
(Suggested further reading: W. D. Hudson, Reason and Right)

LECTURE XX--Mar 28: Thomas Reid's Intuitionist response to Hume.

Readings: Raphael, Vol. II, pp. 265-310.
Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 224-236.

LECTURE XXI--Apr 2: A glance at Hedonistic Utilitarianism (Bentham and Mill) as Classical Empiricism's last gasp in ethical theory. Really, an effort to find a basis of political reform. The subjugation of ethics to politics or, more broadly, social issues. Positivism, Marxism and revolution. The Kantian form of Intuitionism.

Readings: Melden, pp. 317-329. Be sure to bring the Melden to class for use in discussing Bentham and Mill.
Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 236-270.

LECTURE XXII--Apr 4: Kant's theory of the moral life.

Readings: Melden, pp. 329-366
Sidgwick, Outlines, pp. 270-283.

LECTURE XXIII--Apr 9: Kant's theory (continued). Introduction to Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics.

Readings: Finish the Kant selection in Melden, pp. 329-366.
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. xiv-xxi, Book I, chapters I, III and VI.

LECTURE XXIV--Apr 11: Sidgwick--The Three Methods: Egoism, Intuitionism and Utilitarianism. And first, Egoism, as Hedonism.

Readings: Methods, pp. 77-195

LECTURE XXV--Apr 16: Intuitionism: Common Sensical and Philosophical.

Readings: Methods, pp. 199-238, 337-361, 373-407

LECTURE XXVI--Apr 18: The Meaning and Proof of "Utilitarianism."
A "Utilitarianism" that is an Intuitionist theory after all.

Readings: Methods, pp. 411-509

LECTURE XXVII--Apr 23: Nietzsche and Moore--Counsels of despair brought on by metaphysical and epistemological impasses imposed by Empiricism (Naturalism)

Readings: Melden, pp. 435-449 (Nietzsche), 515-538 (Moore)

and Prichard).
(Suggested further readings: ASHOE pp. 199-248)

LECTURE XXVIII--Apr 25: The Anscombe thesis on the futility of Ethical Theory since Sidgwick, and that we should stop doing it. MacIntyre's version of the thesis. Can we say what happened? A glance at Moore and after. Where we are now. Rawls and Levinas.

Final Exam: Weds. May 2, 2-4PM (Commencement Fri. May 11)

**A RATHER COMPREHENSIVE READING LIST FOR
STUDENTS OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICAL THEORY**

- (1). Abelson, Raziel and Kai Nielsen, "Ethics, History of," article in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.3.
- (2). Albee, Ernest, A History of English Utilitarianism.
- (3). Asoka, The Edicts of Asoka, edd. McKeon & Nikam.
- (4). Becker and Becker, edd, Encyclopedia of Ethics.
- (5). Brinton, Crane, A History of Western Morals.
- (6). Broad, C. D., Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy, D. R. Cheney, ed.
- (7). Broad, C. D., Five Types of Ethical Theory. Has chapters on Spinoza, Butler, Hume, Kant, and Sidgwick.
- (8). Bourke, Vernon J., History of Ethics, two vols.
- (9). Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought: 1640-1740.
- (10). Field, C. G., Moral Theory. Parts I and II are devoted to Kant and Aristotle respectively.
- (11). Frankena, W. K., Ethics. Perhaps the best short contemporary introduction to the problems of ethics.
- (12). Halevy, Elie, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism--i.e. of Utilitarianism.
- (13). Hudson, W. Ethical Intuitionism. Concentrates on British thinkers of the 17th and 18th Centuries.
- (14). Kemp, John, Reason, Action and Morality. 'Part One' of this book deals with Cudworth, Locke, Clarke, Hume and Kant.
- (15). Lecky, W. E. H., A History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne, in two volumes. Chapter 1 of volume one is especially valuable. The book deals extensively with moral practices in Western history.
- (16). MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics. Helpful and interesting, but not so much as one would expect from a contemporary book on the history of ethics by a leading philosopher and scholar. Not comparable to Bourke or Sidgwick.
- (17). Mackenzie, J. S., A Manual of Ethics. Excellent compendium on ethical thinking in England at the end of the 19th Century.
- (18). Mackintosh, Sir James, On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy: Chiefly During the 17th and 18th Centuries.
- (19). Martineau, James, Types of Ethical Theory, two volumes. A work and author who deserves careful study and a wider fame than currently enjoyed. Helpful in lifting one from the doldrums of Modernity.
- (20). Moore, G. E., Ethics. Chapters One and Two are among the best things ever written on Utilitarianism.
- (21). Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica. Chapters II-IV are useful for a historical understanding of ethical theory.
- (22). Paton, H. J., The Moral Law. A translation with comments, outline and analysis of Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Indispensable in the study of Kant.

- (23). Prior, A. N., Logic and the Basis of Ethics. An extremely illuminating study of the history and structure of the so-called "Naturalistic Fallacy" and related issues, from Cudworth to G. E. Moore. Very useful.
- (24). Rashdall, Hastings, The Theory of Good and Evil, two volumes. A systematic study of ethical questions, including elaborate historical discussions. An excellent turn-of-the-century scholar.
- (25). Rogers, Reginald A. P., A Short History of Ethics.
- (26). Selby-Bigge. L. A., ed., British Moralists, two volumes. The only rival in its areas of the Raphael anthology. The lengthy Introduction by Selby-Bigge is simply indispensable in the study of History of Ethics.
- (27). Schneewind, J. B. ed. Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays. Especially Hall's paper in this volume, on Mill's "Proof of Utility."
- (28). Schneewind, J. B., ed., Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: An Anthology, two Vols.
- (29). Schweitzer, Albert, Civilization and Ethics. This is Part II of his Philosophy of Civilization. Discusses ethical issues and thinkers from a characteristically "Continental" perspective. Quite a mental shift from the standard Anglo-American outlook.
- (30). Smyth, Newaan, Christian Ethics. Anglo-American Protestant ethics as elaborated at the end of the 19th Century.
- (31). Swabey, W. C., Ethical Theory from Hobbes to Kant. Useful for information, but not profound.
- (32). Willey, Basil, The English Moralists. A rather light and newsy account of some English Moralists up to Coleridge, 1772-1830.
- (33). Wilson, James Q., The Moral Sense.
- (34). Wyschogrod, Edith, Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy.
- (35). Articles on each person or movement in the history of ethical theory will be found in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See also the entire section on ethical topics, pp. 69-134 of vol. 3.

Questions to keep in mind while reading the literature of in the History of Ethics.-

In order to profit from the literature to be read in this course, students should have constantly in mind, as they read, the principal questions that the authors studied are attempting to answer. No doubt the two questions which are always being pursued, directly or indirectly, in this literature are: 1st, When is a person truly well off, or what constitutes human well-being or welfare? We might also put this question by asking, Who is the person to be envied? (Closely related to this is the question. What is the wise way to live? 2nd, What sort of person is a truly good human being, a good person? We might also put this question by asking who is the person to be respected or admired? (Closely related to this is the question. What is the morally praiseworthy way to act? Also, What is the difference between the right action and one that is wrong?)

Now these two questions, or two groups of questions, are pretty clearly different from one another. A person whom no one would respect may be in an enviable position, or even have many enviable qualities. And one can certainly respect those whom one does not envy--Mother Theresa of Calcutta, for example, or someone dying wisely and bravely of cancer. As W. K. Frankena has put it, one may have a good life without leading a good life. And certainly one can lead a good life without having "the good life." Nevertheless, those who have devoted much intelligence and effort to answering these two questions have found great difficulty in holding them apart, and in speaking to one without confusing it with the other. Though different, they are closely related in some important manner. And this is a good reason for having certain more analytic questions in mind as we read, though we must not lose sight of the two primary questions just stated. One may, then, use the following four questions as a guide to the literature to be read. Any full-blown theory of the moral life should provide answers to each of them. It is best for the student to try to write down, with appropriate quotations and page references, the answers of each author to each of these questions--insofar as they actually do answer them:

- a) What is (the nature. analysis. definition of) goodness, rightness worth, obligation, virtue, etc., and their opposites?
- b) Which particular types of persons, things, acts, character traits, institutions, etc., are good, right, obligatory, praiseworthy, blameworthy, etc.?
- c) How does one identify or know which things or acts or persons etc. are good, right, obligatory, etc.? I.e., What are the criteria or evidences of goodness and rightness?
- d) How are good persons and institutions, or right and praiseworthy actions and behavioral traits, produced or maintained? By education? Training? Sanctions? Something else (drugs, genetic engineering, evolution, divine grace)?

The answers to these questions will always rest upon an understanding of the nature of the human being--of what are the parts of a human being, the properties, interrelations and functions of

those parts, and of the properties and functions of the human being as a whole.

Such an understanding will, in turn, always rest on metaphysical (ontological) and epistemological views: views of what ultimate kinds of things there must (and can) be, and of what there can (must) be knowledge of and how it can be known. This explains why so much of ethical writing through the centuries has actually been devoted to ontological and epistemological questions. That is necessarily the case and can only be evaded, not avoided. Those who claim to avoid those questions are no doubt sincere, but they are misguided.

THE PROBLEM OF THE GOOD FOR MAN IN ITS RELATION TO DUTY OR VIRTUE

By: Henry Sidgwick

....Reflection,...will show that the common notion of what is Good for a human being---even if we restrict it to what is "ultimately" good, or "good in itself," and not merely as a means to some further end---includes more than the common notion of what is Right for him, or his Duty: it includes also his Interests or Happiness. No doubt it is commonly believed that it will be ultimately best for a man to do his duty, and that this will promote his real Interest or Happiness; but it does not follow that the notions of duty and interest are to be identified, or even that the inseparable connection between the two may be scientifically known and demonstrated. This connection, indeed, is often, by modern thinkers, regarded rather as a matter of faith;--as something providentially left obscure, in order that duty may be done as duty, and not from a mere calculation of self-love. Thus we arrive at another conception of Ethics, in which it is thought to be concerned primarily with the general rules of Duty or Right Action--sometimes called the Moral Code--viewed as absolutely binding on every man, and properly to be obeyed by him without regard to his personal interests; the relation of duty to the agent's private happiness being regarded as a matter of secondary concern from an ethical point of view. On this view the study connects itself in a new way with theology, so far as the rules of duty are regarded as a code of divine legislation. Further, as we shall see, it has a close affinity to abstract jurisprudence, so far as this is conceived to treat of rules of Law cognisable by reason as naturally and universally valid, and accordingly not dependent on human legislation for their claim to be enforceable by judicial punishment; since such jural rules must always constitute an important part--though not the whole--of the Moral Code. We might contrast this as a modern view of ethics with the view before given, which was that primarily taken in ancient Greek philosophy generally--the transition from the one to the other being due chiefly to the influence of Christianity, but partly also to that of Roman jurisprudence. It is true that the thought of "the Gods' unwritten and unfaltering law" was not by any means absent from the moral reflection of Greece; still, the idea of Law was not taken as the ultimate and fundamental notion in the ancient ethical systems. These proceed on the assumption that man, as a reasonable being, must seek his own highest good in this earthly life, and therefore that any laws he has to obey must be shown to be means to the attainment of this good, or particulars in which it is realized. On this point the change produced by Christianity is more striking if we consider its effects on mankind generally, than if we only regard its influence on the minds that were most completely penetrated by its religious spirit. For the true Christian saint lived even on earth, no less than the pagan philosopher, a life which he regarded as intrinsically preferable to all other modes of earthly existence; and, like the Platonic philosopher, a life of which practical virtue was not so much the essence as the outward expression. Still, even for the saint this earthly life afforded but

an imperfect foretaste of the bliss for which he hoped; and in the view of more ordinary Christians, the ultimate good of man vanished from the scrutiny of mere ethical speculation into the indefinite brightness of a future life of happiness, supernaturally bestowed by God as a reward for obedience to His laws. Or rather, perhaps, by the mass of Christians, the moral code was more commonly regarded, in still closer analogy to human legislation, as supported by penal sanctions; since in all ages of Christianity the fear of the pains of hell has probably been a more powerful motive to draw men from vice than the hope of the pleasures of heaven. On either view the ultimate weal or ill of human beings became something that might be imagined and rhetorically described, but not definitely known or scientifically investigated; and thus the subject-matter of Ethics defined itself afresh as Moral Law, a body of rules absolutely prescribed, and supplying a complete guidance for human conduct, though not claiming to contain an exhaustive statement of human good.*

*From Outlines of the History of Ethics, London, 1954, pp. 6-8.

Outline of topics in the Republic selections in A.I. Melden's Ethical Theories (2nd ed.)

1. What Justice is not--provisional answer to Thrasymachus.
(Book I) Melden pp. 20-44
2. Analysis of the Soul (and the State) into parts.
(Bks II-IV)
Melden pp. 44-59
3. What Justice is.
(Bk IV) Melden pp. 59-61
esp. 60c-d, where just action is also explained.
4. That Justice is good regardless of its instrumentality:
Glaucón answered.
Melden p. 61
5. How the Just Society and the Just Individual is to be Produced.
The Philosopher King and the form of THE GOOD itself (in contrast to mere human good).
(Books V-VII) Melden pp. 61-67
(On Good in relation to Pleasure, pp. 64-5, 81-4)
6. The Decline and Fall of Society (and the Soul) through disorder or insubordination.
(Books VIII-IX) Melden 67-76
7. Justice and Happiness.
Melden 76-85
8. Justice (contra Thrasymachus) is profitable and intrinsically good.
Thrasymachus finally answered.
Melden 85-87.

But:

Is the 'just man' of Plato a morally admirable individual?

Does the person with the ordered soul always do what is right? Does Plato give a satisfactory account of what the just act is? It is supposed to be "behavior that helps to produce and to preserve" justice in the soul. But suppose taking a pill did that, and nothing else did. Would pill taking then be the just and (note) honorable action?

And is the just man indeed going to be the happiest? Could not accidents or fate leave the just man miserable?

Some of these critical points are raised by D. Sach's "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic," Philosophical Review, 1963. See also T. Y. Henderson, "In Defense of Thrasymachus," Amer. Phil. Quart. July 1970.

Task (Topic) Outline of the entire text of Plato's Republic, not just selections. The page numbers are the Stephanus pagination (in margins of the text).

1. To show that external definitions of dikaiosune ("really okayness") do not help us understand or appreciate it for what it is in itself. BK I. (Incidentally, a clarification of function & Virtue, Stephanus pagination 352e-354.)

2. Challenge through Gyges to show that "justice" is desirable independently of externals, especially success and reputation (Stephanus. 357-367)

3. Strategy: see the soul (where justice must really be) under a magnifying glass by laying out the structure of the city, in which the essential human capacities and their interactions must manifest themselves. A city built in words (369-427) The Philosopher/Guardian introduced-- (376)--Dog as Philosopher. The perfectly good city (427-428) And its virtues of classes (428-435)--esp. Justice.

4. Application of this structure to the individual's internal parts, the soul (435-441). New argument for parts of soul from "different" motions (436-441). Same virtues, now internal to individual (442-445). Same principle of "each part attending to its business."

5. To deal with objections to the account of the city--THREE WAVES:

- (1). Equality of women as guardians (451-457),
- (2). Women and children in common amongst the guardians (457-469) (Eugenics),
- (3) Kings (rulers) must be philosophers (473- etc)

6. Who (what) philosophers are: Those who love and embrace what is, the one rather than the many (474-480)

7. Identifying philosopher types from among the masses (484 - 504). Testing by pleasures and pains of body and mind.

8. The highest knowledge: What is hangs, in being and knowledge, from goodness itself, the form of the Good. The Divided Line. (505- 513)

9. The difficulty of the upward climb to the form of the Good. Why people in general hate the philosopher (514-521)

10. The course of studies which can lift the soul from becoming to being. (522-541):

Gymnastics (521), Poetry (522), Arithmetic (522-526),
 Geometry (526-528), Astronomy (528-530),
 Harmonics (530- 531), DIALECTICS (531-541).
 On Dialectics esp. 532a-b & 533d-e

11. The types of cities and souls--5 types:
 Aristocracy (rule of the wise and virtuous)
 Timocracy (rule by honor)
 Oligarchy (Rule by wealth)
 Democracy (Rule by mass)
 Tyranny (Rule by mad power and obsession)

 Book VIII, for kinds of Governments
 Book IX, kinds of Individual souls

12. The Three Pleasures and the guidance of life. (580-592)

13. Return to education and the curse of IMITATION--(595-608)
 Immortal Rewards: the Myth of Er ((614-621)

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WHAT IS THE SOUL FOR PLATO?

Ath. And what is the definition of that which is named "soul"? Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given -- the motion which can move itself?

Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name "soul"?

{Laws, X (Stephanus pagination 896)}

This idea of the soul as self-mover persists through the ages and revives in the Cambridge Platonists and others.

Some criticisms of Plato's ethical theory:

1. The Psychological theory (or theory of soul) upon which the ethical theory is based is drawn from some highly abstract concepts and arguments, which leave the question of exactly how, e.g., reason relates to passion, quite unclear. (See how Aristotle will improve on this matter.) Where is the will in Plato's theory?

2. This first criticism is reflected in obscurity about how the Knower-Kings and their fellow citizens among the police and workers actually relate to one another. In the abstract it all seems right. It might even be possible to work it out in some consistent detail. But clearly the other classes cannot understand the rationale for the knowers' edicts, and it is difficult to see how the requisite social authority would function.

3. Sachs' criticism in "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?" (Philosophical Review, 1963) has been echoed by many others and seems difficult to turn aside. Sachs holds that the "vulgar" or ordinary conception of justice is more closely tied to the standard, common sense list of just acts than Plato allows. Couldn't the person who is "just" in Plato's special sense of having a "balanced" soul engage in extensive wrong-doing and remain just ("balanced")? (Plato might well reply that the "vulgar" conception is no conception at all, but a vague and incoherent notion, and hence can't be used as a basis of criticism of his views.)

4. One might reasonably doubt, on empirical grounds, that the just person, especially as Plato defines him or her, will be better off than the unjust; will be more benefited (in the terms spelled out at the end of book one and in book ten) than the unjust. This would not refute, however, his main argument that the person who has justice and nothing else is better-off as a human being than one who lacks justice but has everything else.

5. The theory of knowledge and being he maintains is not, in its totality, really required by his basic theory of justice, and has many points that are difficult to defend: e.g., the idea that there must be 'forms' if there is to be knowledge of the sort required for justice and the building of the just 'state'. This is not, as it stands, a criticism of the tenability of Plato's theory, but it does bring out why it is very hard to make Plato a competitor in the current thought world, which is nominalist and phenomenalist to the core.

For further critical issues see: T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, chap. VIII; and J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, Chap. XIII.

ON WHAT TO MAKE OF THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I

The first Book of the Republic (Steph. 327-354) usually strikes the contemporary student as quite puzzling. A number of personalities are introduced whom we today rarely have any sense at all of their significance. They all meant something to the Athenian reader, at least, because of the actual history of Athens. And they represent positions on the primary issue of the Republic--Who is the really good person (like Socrates)? And Which is the really good city (like Socrates wanted Athens to be)? The arguments Socrates brings to bear against those positions seem thin and forced, at least in some cases, and the connection of the end of Book I (Thrasymachus shown wrong about whether the just or unjust person is better off) with the beginning of Book II (the Gyges myth) is not transparent. Book I actually constitutes one of the "search" dialogues, which seem to not get us anywhere. (See Socrates' admission at 354c.) But this is so only for the superficial or uninformed reader. Anyone will be greatly helped with Book I by reading H. W. B. Joseph's treatment on it in his collection, Ancient and Modern Philosophy, and perhaps the first fifty pages of Julia Annas' An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Chapter I of A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man And His Work, is also extremely helpful in setting the real life context of Plato's work.

There are three sources of "moral enlightenment," as we might say, that are firmly (if not brutally) set aside in Republic Book I.

A. **Cephalus** represents the successful, socially respected individual, who actually thinks there is some connection between wealth and doing the right thing (being "just"). (330d-331b) The most useful purpose of wealth, he says, is that it helps you avoid intentional wrongdoing. (331b)

Here the dialogue takes philosophical flight as Socrates replies: "Beautifully put, Cephalus. But speaking of justice (dikaiousune), do you really think it's as simple as telling the truth and returning what you receive, or are both these acts sometimes just and sometimes unjust?" And he goes on to mention the case of returning a weapon to a friend who has gone mad. "No one would say you ought to return it,...or tell him the whole truth either." (331c) The phrase "speaking of justice" signals that we are not going to deal with justice itself, with what justice is.

Two things immediately emerge here that are central to Plato's understanding of thought:

1. With reference to things that are sometimes one way and sometimes another, Plato's view is that they fall within the domain of mere opinion, guesses and illusion. If the things mentioned are sometimes just and sometimes not, that just means we haven't got to justice itself, which will (like all "forms" or essences) always be what it ever is, and always not be what it ever is not. If Cephalus and his kin manage to "do the right thing" it is only by chance.

2. You can't say what something is by giving a list. This is a standard point in Plato's "logic." "So telling the truth and returning what you receive isn't the definition of justice," Socrates points out. (331d) No, nor is any mere list. With lists, as well as

things that vary, you are still in the realm of opinion (doxa), where you may or may not happen to be right, but have no idea of what you are really dealing with.

That concludes Cephalus, the successful, respected and morally complacent individual, to whom many others still in the cave nevertheless look to for moral guidance. (What a day Plato would have had with TV interviews and radio "talk shows"! Also: remember out saying, "If you're so smart, why aincha rich?")

B. **Polemarchus** represents divine inspiration mediated through cultural authority. In short, religion. He introduces the word of "the wise and godlike Simonides" (331e), an inspired poet, to the effect "That it's just to give 'each his due'." (Ibid.) But this requires clarification of what "due" is, and to whom, and under what conditions. (332-336a) In particular, "due" seems to mean that it is just to harm one's enemies as well as help one's friends. But justice, Socrates argues, cannot harm. For to harm is to make unjust (less well off). (335a-336a) Nothing produces its opposite.

C. **Thrasymachus** cleverness and power. The just is whatever one can get away with. And the just person is the one who can get away with the most, be most powerful. (336b and following) This is the "boss," and politically the "ruler." Justice is actually what most people (stupid idiots) call "injustice." This is the person who is really well off, the only sense of "really good" that matters. (See 344c-d and 345a-b) So Socrates sets out to show that the unjust life is not superior to the just. (347e) This leads to a discussion of skill, function, virtue and soul with which Book I concludes. Socrates attempts to prove that the unjust person (the one who can get away with anything) is not better off, "as a human being," than the just one.

SOME POINTS IN ETHICAL THEORY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS

Plato and Aristotle concluded that the fundamental distinction for ethical theory was that between the virtuous and non-virtuous person. Moreover, this distinction had to be spelled out in terms of the inner or hidden dimension of the self. Finally, the virtuous inner state was--in somewhat different senses for the two philosophers--a rational one. Human goodness is, for both, goodness of kind, the essence of the human kind being capacity to know.

The Greek political system, such as it was, collapsed because of inability to produce rational citizens. It could not transform the inner dimension of its people into one of rationality. The various city states ruined themselves through warfare until Rome finally arose to enforce a peace. The genius of Rome was not rationality as the Greeks understood it, but military force under positive law.

Ethical theory thus retreated, in the Stoics and Epicureans, from CHARACTER to a focus on STATES OF INDIVIDUAL MINDS. (See Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, pp. 73, 83, 86.) Indeed, this emphasis is found in Aristotle's faltering substitution of CONTEMPLATION for MORAL VIRTUE as the human good in the Xth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Retreat from the world is not, as is so often thought, a Christian invention, but is wistfully present in Aristotle and becomes, in one form or another, the dominant approach to human well-being and wisdom centuries before Christianity became dominant.

On Aristotle's 'contemplative' version of the human good and the good human, the human enters 'blessedness' by engaging in the activity, contemplation of truth and reality, that essentially characterizes God. (Melden, pp. 135a-139b)

Augustine, deriving his basic conceptions from the Judeo-Christian experience and history, interpreted human blessedness as **loving contemplation of God**, understood in terms of Jesus and his re-formulation of the Mosaic law of the Old Testament. Then, on the basis of this relation, human personality would, as Aristotle had it, become godlike itself. The resemblance was not in the form of a cognitive activity, however, turned away from the world, but in the form of love, agape, which was to embrace everyone in reach. This meant that good was to be done to all: "You know it is said you are to love your neighbor and hate your enemy. But I'm telling you to love (agapate) your enemies, bless those that curse you, do good to those that hate you, and pray for those that make your life miserable. That way you will manifest the family resemblance. Your Father in the heavens, after all, makes His sun rise on the stinkers along with the good, and provides rain for the just along with the crooks." (Matthew 5:43-44)

Augustine thus understood it was right "that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and, in the second, do good to everyone he can reach." (Melden p. 177) For St. Thomas, "The first precept of the

law, <is> that good is to be done and promoted, and evil avoided."
(Melden p. 203)

You might try out a comparison of Plato's just person and Aristotle's virtuous person with the agapic person of Augustine. Which one would you rather have for a room mate or co-worker? Which one would you rather be?

This type of ethical theory, which Wm. Frankena calls "Agapism" (Ethics, 2nd edition, pp. 56-59), is expanded by Augustine and other Christian thinkers to include a re-interpretation of the four "cardinal virtues" of antiquity and the addition of several other virtues. (See handout from The Morals of the Catholic Church and Sidgwick, Outlines, 117, 124-134, 143) The dark side of the moral drama in human life is played by the "seven deadly sins." (Sidgwick, pp. 129, 135) The person who avoided these and was possessed by Love, as spelled out in I Cor. 13 and elsewhere and displayed through the full range of virtues, was a good and Godly person.

PROBLEMS:

1. Institutionalization of Christianity led to stressing 'faith' over love. Creedal Christianity made it possible to be 'Christian', by professing certain beliefs, without a smell of honest love.

2. It also led to 'official' views concerning what actions were right or wrong. Casuistry, the art of solving doubtful cases (Sidgwick, 151-152), eventually evolved into a ridiculous 'probabilism'. (pp. 153-154) The moral life and moral rectitude was trivialized and alienated from the basic issue of what kind of person is concerned. This is a major reason for the shift to natural law in St. Thomas and afterward.

3. Then of course: Does God exist? If not, and moral distinctions depend upon His character or his will, then there are no moral distinctions. As Ivan Karamazov says: "If God does not exist, then everything is permissible." The strength of moral nihilism in European culture of the 19th and 20th Centuries is significantly reflective of the extent to which the Christian version of agapism had come to permeate Western culture.

4. Also, reverting back to issues under #2, if God does exist, how is His character and will to be known without an authoritative institution? And how might such an institution know? And how is it to be held responsible? (Plato's problem of how to control the rulers never goes away.)

So: As central moral concept we move from

1. Rational Character (Plato, Aristotle), to--
2. Relation to God and agapic character (Augustine, etc.), to--
3. Natural law in Aquinas and Hobbes.

By Hobbes we have said good by to:

God, Soul, Virtue, and to the moral ideal as Hero or Saint.

LAW takes on a central significance in ethical theory in the period from St. Thomas (1225-1274) to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)-- [see Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, pp. 144-168]. In fact, St. Thomas' ethical theory remains one of virtue and happiness. But subsequent developments toward the "modern" period of thought give his concept of "natural law" a greater significance than it has within his own theory. Certainly few if any concepts are more significant for modern ethical thought than that of law. But what is law?

There is no simple answer to this question. Nevertheless, something must be said. So we shall make an inclusive statement and draw some distinctions before proceeding to what St. Thomas says: The most inclusive idea of law is that of A GENERAL OR REGULAR CONNECTION OR ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EVENTS, PROPERTIES, ARRANGEMENTS OR ENTITIES AND OTHER EVENTS, PROPERTIES, ARRANGEMENTS OR ENTITIES, SUCH THAT, GIVEN THE EXISTENCE OR OBTAINING OF THE ONE, THE OTHER DOES (OR DOES NOT EXIST OR OBTAIN. This may be more closely specified in various ways. For example, we can say that the connection is no mere generality or regularity, but exceptionless (universal) or even necessary. The Kantian concept of law as universal and necessary connection is often assumed in contemporary discussions.

We must also distinguish:

DESCRIPTIVE LAW:--Categorical (A is B)
 -Probabalistic (A has probability x of
 being B)
 PRESCRIPTIVE LAW:--Positive (political, legal edict)
 (normative) -Social (custom)
 -Moral ('natural')

We also must distinguish law as a connection in reality from law as formula for (statement, thought, proposition, judgment about) the regularity in reality. Newton discovered a connection in reality, and expressed it in mathematical 'laws', i.e. formulae or theories. Of course various issues about "realism" with regard to the "laws of nature" arise here and are dealt with in the philosophy of science and metaphysics.

St. Thomas says that "Since a law is a kind of rule or measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules [judgment, theory?]; and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. -- Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something because of some law; so that any inclination arising from a law may be called a law, not essentially, but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence (lust) is called the law of the members." (Melden 189d) And: "Therefore it [the rational creature] has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end; and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law." (194c) And: "Law is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the

common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community."
(192c-d) Reason is associated with law in most ethical theories that make much of law. Locke even identifies natural law and reason in the 2nd Treatise. What is reason? It is the mental capacity to discern by thinking connections that are not given to sense perception.

Mid-term for Phil.442, Spring 2001
TAKE HOME EXAM

Write on the three following questions:

1. What is ethical theory, why is it a human necessity, and what role does the history of ethics play in it?
2. The discovery of the rational soul is basic to the origination of ethical theory in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Compare the views of Plato and Aristotle on how reason is involved in being a good person and doing the "right" thing, and take a reasoned position on which gives the most adequate account. (Part/whole, function, good of kind, etc.)
3. Describe the basic transitions of ethical thought after Aristotle and up to St. Thomas Aquinas, and how "natural law" naturally emerges from the quandries of a God-based ethical theory. Be sure to explain the concept of a "natural law" in Aquinas, and the contrast between classical natural law and modern natural law (see Darwell and Darwell handout).

These questions are phrased in such a way that they allow a good bit of liberty in answering them. The premium is on thoughtfulness and critical appreciation of the views examined. You may want to question the questions. Remember to concentrate on argument or reasons given (or not given).

Friendly advice: Take an afternoon to pull together and review the materials relevant to the questions (follow your class notes), and then sit down and write for no more than two hours. (Do it Sat. or Sunday.) Re-read and insert corrections and additions on Tues., and turn it in next day. Just make it legible. I don't grade on physical appearance of the paper. Often the messier the paper the cleaner the thought.

Due at opening of class on Feb. 21. I will be happy to respond to questions by telephone on the evening of the 20th, 8-10PM. 818-716-0652. Of course you may call on the weekend also or anytime. If I'm not there, leave your name, number and a time to call you.

LECTURE NOTES:

For the first of two lectures on MacIntyre's After Virtue

During the USC course, History of Ethics to 1900

After Virtue is subtitled "A Study in Moral Theory." We take this to mean that it purports to be or provide a logically coherent and grounded set of propositions that comprehend the moral life or moral phenomena for the purposes of understanding or knowledge. When we have finished with it, if both it and we are successful, we should understand the moral life: be able to represent to ourselves the way the moral life actually is--what its parts or elements are or are not, and how (at least in general) they relate to each other and to other elements of reality beyond it.

MacIntyre's earlier studies led him to hold that "the nature of moral community and moral judgment in distinctively modern societies was such that it was no longer possible to appeal to moral criteria in a way that had been possible in other times and places---and that this was a moral calamity!" (p. ix) He wanted to reject Stalinism, but found no rational basis to do so either in liberalism or Marxism. The conclusion which he reaches in After Virtue "is that Marxism's moral defects and failures arise from the extent to which it, like liberal individualism, embodies the ethos of the distinctively modern and modernizing world, and that nothing less than a rejection of a large part of that ethos will provide us with a rationally and morally defensible standpoint from which to judge and to act--and in terms of which to evaluate various rival and heterogeneous moral schemes which compete for our allegiance." (p. x)

Thus what drives MacIntyre is essentially the same social fact that has motivated the "analytical" side of Anglo-American ethical thinking throughout the 20th Century: the (real or only perceived) inability to come to rational agreement, not just about what we ought to do, but about why we ought to do what we ought to do, or about why the actions we believe to be right (or wrong) are so. I think that the main and indispensable point of MacIntyre's book is not to offer a particular moral theory--though he comes close--but to explain why it is that we are in the condition of moral disarray which he says we are. He does, as we shall see, offer a particular theory of human life, one which at least implies a framework within which any accurate moral theory must fall.

We should not too quickly agree on his description of our condition, or the condition of moral theory, at the present time. His "Disquieting Suggestion" of Chapter 1 is introduced, a la Ludwig der zweite, by a little imaginative "story" about the natural sciences. <pp. 1-2, Read> This shows, he says, "a world in which the language of natural science, or parts of it at least, continues to be used but is in a grave state of disorder." (p. 2) And now the application: "The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of

grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts of which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have--very largely, if not entirely--lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical of morality." (p. 2)

Now it is not immediately clear what might be done if this state of affairs actually obtains. He is going to take as the center of his focus strange beasts called concepts -- for like all philosophers he wants to deal with necessary connections and identity. But the concept of concept is, helas!, one of the most obscure and contested parts of 20th Century philosophy. MacIntyre told us, nevertheless, in his first breath and with no apologies (p. ix), that "The notion that the moral philosopher can study the concepts of morality merely by reflecting, Oxford armchair style, on what he or she and those around him or her say and do is barren." --- No less, he adds, if the armchair be located in Princeton NJ or Cambridge MA, not to mention further west in nutty CA. "Analytical" philosophy as well as Phenomenology or Existentialism ("Continental" philosophy)--other beasts from the philosophical zoo--apparently cannot even detect the moral disaster in the midst of which we live. (pp. 2-3) "Yet the powerlessness of this kind of philosophy does not leave us quite resourceless." (p. 3)

It is historical studies that have opened his own eyes, it seems. Apparently what cannot be done by peering directly ("merely by reflecting") upon concepts--perhaps because they cannot be peered directly upon at all!--can be done by "observing" or analyzing (!?*) historical processes.

Well, shall we hope? But why don't historians see our condition? MacIntyre explains the obliviousness of modern academic history to our collapsed moral state, not by the inherent historical invisibility of that state, but by the fact that modern academic history is a result of that very state--so that "from its value-neutral viewpoint moral disorder must remain largely invisible." (p. 4) Perhaps it is reasonable to think that a history that cannot see values as realities cannot see a real historical progression in values.

But we must leap ahead here to make a statement about the heart of MacIntyre's theory of the moral life. Otherwise the student will lose a tremendous amount of time trying to locate his view where he says it lies--when in fact it does not lie there at all. He talks as if his "discoveries" relevant to moral theory lay in history and sociology. He says, for example, at the opening of Chapter 3: "A moral philosophy... characteristically presupposes a sociology. For every moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial conceptual analysis of the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons, motives, intentions and actions, and in so doing generally presupposes some claim that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in the real social world."

Now actually, if one knows what to look for, the last clause in this statement lets most of the cats out of the bag. For it indicates that

"the real social world" contains concepts as constituents, and as constituents which "govern" what goes on in that world. "Concepts" here play the role of Platonic forms or Aristotelian (Husserlian) essences, in that they found identities and necessary relations in--social, therefore ethical--reality. And of course this is just the sort of thing that any historian or sociologist would discover to the complete astonishment of any philosopher who has tried to put "concepts"--or "reason" and "rationality," for that is what we are talking about with "concepts"--into real events or actions. These are metaphysical claims, not sociological claims: claims about the categorial constituents of beings of the type dealt with in moral theory--actions, characters, roles, persons and personal relations.

Thus at the end of Chapter 3 we read that the transformations of the self he charts up to the present "emotivist" version (p. 32) moves in necessary correlation with appropriate transformations of "the forms of moral discourse, the language of morality,...Indeed it is wrong to separate the history of the self and its roles from the history of the language which the self specifies and through which the roles are given expression. What we discover is a single history and not two parallel ones." (p. 35) Language and reality are bound in an ontological union. The necessities (the "logic") of discourse are bled into life to give it the constraining order required.

See the crucial pages 28-29 and 32-34 on the ontology of social role and character and individual. See the comments about a human life and a "story" on p. 130, 144, 174 and elsewhere. See the comments about the qualities (concepts?) linked to courage as making it what it is in heroic societies, on pp. 122-123. And see above all the claims about tradition, narrative and personal identity on pp. 216 and following.

Note such central claims as this: "In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that its unity is <?!*^+?!> the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask 'What is good for me?' is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion....The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest." (218-219) The virtues then are what they are only within a narrative. They are "those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good." (219)

Now MacIntyre never tries to justify his ontology of concepts and social reality, his ontology of action, character, life and story, or his "conceptual analyses" in terms of the "narrative" necessities and identities in the ages of Homer, Aristotle, or others. He never tries to defend his views on these ontological and logical issues. The shade of good St. Ludwig slants long across the contemporary philosophical landscape, and provides cover for many a philosophical programme--whether or not he would be happy about that. It is nevertheless quite disingenuous of MacIntyre to proceed as if to get the low-down on what goes on with moral theory and the moral life we had merely to examine a few historical vignettes. The kind of

essential structure in life he refers us to is not more obvious than any essence or natural law--and indeed is but a linguisticized form of essence and natural law. His 1988 book Whose Justice? Which Rationality? does not, I regret to say, do any better with the basic issues about ontology and logic in the makeup of human life and society than did After Virtue? He of course has a wide audience and many cohorts who assume that nothing useful can be said about these issues, and so we should just get on with the business of whatever branch of philosophy or life we are concerned with. And so we shall. But it remains that MacIntyre's accounts of virtue, character and human life, as well as his interpretations of past moral theorists, simply beg some of the most important questions imaginable about human life.

Certainly these questions emerge into the text when he comes, at the outset of Chapter 15, to discuss the "two different kinds of obstacle, one social and one philosophical" (p. 204), to "any contemporary attempt to envisage each human life as a whole, as a unity." The social obstacles come from the way "modernity partitions each human life into a variety of segments, each with its own norms and modes of behavior." (204) The philosophical obstacles derive from two distinct tendencies. One, "domesticated in analytical philosophy," is "the tendency to think atomistically about human action and to analyze complex actions and transactions in terms simple components.... That particular actions derive their character as parts of larger wholes is a point of view alien to our dominant ways of thinking..." (204) The other "tendency" is "at home in both sociological theory and in existentialism. This makes "the unity of human life...invisible" by drawing "a sharp separation...either between the individual and the roles that he or she plays <Sartre>...or between the different role--and quasi-role--enactments of an individual life so that life comes to appear as nothing but a series of unconnected episodes..." <Goffman> These, of course, are opposed the the "concept" of self MacIntyre sees as necessary to a society if virtues are to be possible in it: "a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end." (p. 205) But these metaphysical claims are not justified by MacIntyre--certainly not by his excursions into "history."

For now, we turn to some of his interpretations of past moral epochs.

He holds (p. 185) that "We...have at least three very different conceptions of a virtue to confront: a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her social role (Homer); a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards the achievement of the specifically human telos, whether natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the New Testament and Aquinas); a virtue is a quality which has utility in achieving earthly and heavenly success (Franklin)."

THE VIRTUES OF HEROIC SOCIETY (Chap. 10)---

Key features pp. 122-124

The two selves p. 126

"Lessons" about virtue pp. 126-127 <very important>

THE VIRTUES OF ATHENS (Chap. 11)

Plato points to "signs of incoherence" in Greek Society p. 131
 The shift occurring in "roles" and "structure" pp.132-3
 The 4 "Athenian" views of the virtues. p. 135
 cases of virtues 136ff
 agon--contest/conflict central 137-8
 the new drama 144-5
 the Sophoclean self 145

ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF VIRTUE (Chap. 12)

No sense of the historical p. 147
 But speaks as a citizen of the polis 147-8
 What the virtues are for him 148-9
 Virtues and laws of the community 151-2
 The mean and phronesis 154-5
 The 4 essential elements of practical reasoning 161-2
 Three questions that threaten the Aristotelian account
 of the virtues 162-4: tragedy/conflict 163-4

MEDIEVAL ASPECTS (Chap. 13)

Too many ideals working in this period 165-6
 Emergence of the will and sin as ethically central to
 the Christian narrative--retreat into
 interiority
 168. State, not disposition. Stoic element 170
 The 3 dimensions of Medieval virtue 171
 Roles and the individual in Ancient and Medieval 172
 The non-Aristotelian aspect 174
 Charity/ new narrative 174-5
 What the virtues are in Medieval period mid-176
 Conflict again 179-180

THE NATURE OF THE VIRTUES -- As History Shows! (Chap. 14)

There is a core concept of virtue uniting all these
 accounts 186
 The centrality of PRACTICE 187-190, 194
 What virtue is 191, 193-4
 Three ways MacIntyre's account is Aristotelian 197-9
 Evil practices. How can a disposition be a virtue if
 the practice it sustains is evil? Answer 200ff

<Discussion of MacIntyre to be resumed in final session>

Outline of topics for final remarks on MacIntyre:

1. Review of "practice" (187), "internal" good (188-190) and "virtue." (191ff)
2. Practices and institutions. (194)
3. Need to supplement this statement on virtues (200-203)
4. Met by a theory of the unity of human life ("narrative") (205)
 - two mistaken theories (204)
 - intentions and "settings" (206-209)
 - "...in successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing we always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the individual concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer. It is now becoming clear that we render the actions of others intelligible in this way because action itself has a basically historical character." (211-212; cf 215)
5. The centrality and ultimacy of "intelligibility" (214)
6. The essence of man, no less! (216) -- "a story-telling animal"
7. Narrative, intelligibility, accountability, personal identity (218-219)
8. Quest and virtue (219), clan and history (220-222)
9. Tradition and virtue (223)
10. From virtues to virtue. (233)
 - the fade-out of morality (243)
11. The vacuity of contemporary "justice" (Chap 17 <pp. 244ff>)
- the virtues tradition at odds with modern economic order 254-5)
12. What matters now, in our present "dark ages." (263)

*****POSTSCRIPT ADDITIONS

13. Arguments, rational superiority and social context (267-270)
14. "Best theory so far" (270-271, 277)
15. Virtues and the "three stages" (275)

NOTES FOR A LECTURE ON DAVID HUME'S ETHICAL THEORY:

1. Hume's theory is a natural law theory of the moral life and moral reality. Like the theories of Aquinas and Hobbes, it is based on claims about the inclinations or tendencies that are in human beings without dependence upon education or institutions or acts of will. (291c-292a) Unlike Aquinas and Hobbes his theory is not based upon any unified account of what the good is, and the inclinations in question have, according to him, nothing to do with human reason.

2. Hume is not a moral sceptic, much less a nihilist. He stoutly ranks "those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions... among the disingenuous disputants," and insists that "there is no scepticism so scrupulous...as absolutely to deny all <moral> distinction between..." good and bad persons, right and wrong actions. (Melden 274a)

3. While (for reasons to be discussed) the moral distinctions are alleged by him to be not ideational or representational ones--not aspects of reality that correspond to our ideas--but rather distinctions that fall wholly within our sensations or feelings, they are nonetheless objective matters of fact, in the sense that they are not dependent upon how one feels or thinks about them. The viciousness of wilful murder is discovered when, and only when, "...you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." (Treatise, Book II, Part I, Sect. i <p. 10 of Treatise handout> cp. 303b) <Raphael, Vol II, pp. 18-19>

4. As the passage just quoted indicates, this theory is a version of SPECIES RELATIVISM, and, indeed, of SPECIES SUBJECTIVISM. There would be no moral distinctions in reality if there were no human beings. Even for all rational beings the moral distinctions need not be the same (as truth and falsehood are), but, "like the perception of beauty and deformity, they are founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species." (Melden 274b-c) "The final sentence...<on moral distinctions>...depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." (275c-d) The standard of reason, "...being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being..." But the standard of taste and morals, "...arising from the eternal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence." (311d-312a. Cp comments about ingratitude (308d) and about the beauty of the circle. (310d-311a) <Note: had God/Nature so arranged our "peculiar fabric" that the sentiment of moral approbation sprang forth toward wilful murder, then wilful murder would be morally praiseworthy, on this

account. There is no inherent necessity tying moral approbation to what in fact are now virtues and praiseworthy actions!>

5. "The true origin of morals," "the foundation of ethics,...those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived" (276a-b & c-d) "...is a question of fact, not of abstract science," and "...we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances." (276d) Hume rejects "every system of ethics...which is not founded on fact and observation." (276d) "We shall endeavour to follow a very simple method: we shall analyse that complication of mental qualities which form what, in common life, we call Personal Merit." <read sequel> We can be sure of not being "considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue." One "... needs only enter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him..." (276b)

6. We identify mental traits as virtues by finding that the peculiar feeling of moral approbation is directed upon it. "We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations." (Treatise, p. 471, Oxford edition <Raphael, II, p. 20) This is crucial. We do not identify the moral sentiment as that which is directed upon the virtues. We identify the virtues as those traits that are the objects of the sentiment of moral approbation, and this sentiment is, apparently, directly identifiable to us for what it is, perhaps as is the sensation of red (or is that a red sensation?).

7. Cases of "personal merit": BENEVOLENCE (277-278) & JUSTICE (278D-290) In both cases Hume holds that it is the utility of these mental traits or motives that grounds the sentiment of moral approbation toward them--though not wholly in the case of benevolence. On the former see p. 278c-d; on the latter. (280c, 281c, 290c-d, 315) Justice is the observance of the general rules that govern ownership or property in society, and the possibility of planning for life. (281c-d, 307d, 311b-c,) Sections VI -VIII are titled, successively, "Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves," "Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves," and "Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others." Of those immediately agreeable to ourselves Hume mentions cheerfulness, greatness of mind, courage, undisturbed philosophical tranquility, benevolence and poetic ability.

8. The "deduction" which Hume makes from the "comparison of particular instances" of virtue is expressed in his definition of virtue: "It is the nature and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by every one who considers or contemplates it. But some qualities produce pleasure, because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable to the person himself; others produce it more immediately..." (Note #1 to Section VIII of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Cf. Melden 301c, 306b-c,

307a, 309c for similar statements.)

9. All facts of the case must be exhibited by experience and reason before the moral sentiment is allowed to come forth. (309d-310b)

10. Having established the generalization about the nature of virtue, Hume exercises a critique of the 'Monkish virtues'. (302c-d)

11. Utility pleases by "affecting the benevolent principles of our frame." (298b) The general principle of "Sympathy" (295, 296, 303b) or "humanity." (298c) The "general language." (303d, 296c-d)

12. Hume's critique of ethical egoism: four arguments. (293)

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13. The arguments against the power of reason to bring action about (against "the practicality of reason")

And against deriving "ought" from "is"

as presented in the handout from the Treatise (R pp. 3-19):

{If possible one should read at this point the Treatise, Book II, Part III, Sect. iii; and Book III, Part I, sect. i & ii; and Book III, Part III, sects. i and vi. Most of the Raphael selections are included in these sections. }

Reason cannot interact with passion because the world of ideas (reason) and that of passion (realities, non-representatives) do not interact, "are totally removed from each other"--because ideas are not real?

Or possibly: It is an observable fact that reasoning (of either of its two varieties, demonstrative or probable) does not alone result in action. (Raphael, British Moralists, II, pp. 3-4)

Hence reason cannot oppose passion, or be contrary to it. (R. pp. 5-6)

'Explanation' of why people have thought reason and passion could oppose each other. (R. pp. 6-7)

A further argument: Morals influence action.

Reason influences nothing.

So: Morals are not from reason. (R. pp. 8-10)

Vice or virtue not a part or property ('matter of fact') of acts. (R 18-19)

The (alleged) Is/Ought gap. (R p. 19)

From Hume on Ethics is Epistemology Driven.

Hume:

"...It is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses." (p. 147)

"...We can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment,..." (p. 155)

"Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion." (p. 155)

These quotations are from Section V of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Page numbers refer to the C. W. Hendel, ed., Hume Selections. The application of these statements in their locus is to 'necessary connexion' or causation. But they are to be taken in complete generality.

If sensation is taken as the indicator of the boundaries of knowledge and of what exists, then certain important areas of reality and knowledge, as presupposed in ordinary human life, are omitted or severely called into question. These are mainly:

1. Moral (and other) values
2. Whole material objects (chairs, trees, blades of grass)
3. Minds (mine, yours, God, disembodied)
4. Past and future events.
5. Theoretical entities: atoms, unconscious drives or thoughts
6. Classes, and relations of class membership, inclusion
 e.g. the class of fractions contains irrational numbers.
 or the class of U. S. Citizens contains Tibetans, etc.
7. Universals and relations of universals,
 e.g. Blue
 Blue is a color
 4 is the square of 2
 The double of the area of a square is the square of its diagonal
8. etc.?

Thus, perhaps the most important question in modern and contemporary ethics and philosophy is expressed in Hume's words:

"What is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the record of our memory." (Section IV of Hume's Enquiry)

Kant tries to save ethics by recourse to transcendental arguments to necessary non-sense-perceptible conditions of the possibility of moral experience and morality. Thus all the talk of a metaphysics (a beyond-the-physics) of morals. (Melden, 318ff)

Intuitionism, the insistence that we have perception that is not sense-perception, re-emerges in 19th Century British ethical thought (a throwback to Samuel Clarke et. al. and, further, back to Plato) in people such as Sidgwick (Melden p. 483-484, 488-489) and Moore (Melden pp. 520-522, 524) On Sidgwick see also the 3 'intuitions' in the Preface to the 6th edition of Methods of Ethics.

Bentham and Mill try to base ethics on a value that is feelable, pleasure. This makes value Empirical. How that works we shall see.

Conservatism can be understood as a theory of knowledge which treats institutions, rituals and traditions as incorporating moral knowledge that is not individualistic or sense perceptible. It posits traditions with their institutions as a source of wisdom, over against reason and sensation (or feeling or sentiment), and therefore seeks on the whole to conserve them against massive change. Its deadly foe is romantic revolutionism--the idea that by acts of will and legislation the social scene can be remade to realize a vision of the good society which has arisen in the mind of some contemporary individual or committee. It is not just an irrationalism or a reactionism, but a view of how human understanding or reason works: that good judgment about the conduct of human affairs is expressed in enduring practices and institutions.--

"How but in custom and in ceremony
Are innocence and beauty born?
Ceremony's a name for the rich horn,
And custom for the spreading laurel tree."
[W. B. Yeats, "A Prayer for My Daughter"]

Historicism (Nietzsche) is another response to empiricism. The values that function are simply the result of historical forces that cause them to be dominant.

And finally Linguisticism (MacIntyre), the fate of the 20th century. It is finally, I believe, very difficult to make this significantly different from Historicism.

So, a nest of -isms mark the epistemological domination of ethics in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Transcendentalism, Hedonism, Intuitionism (also called 'non-naturalism'), Conservatism, Historicism, and Linguisticism, all responses to the devastation of knowledge by Empiricism..

Phil. 442
Spring 2001

SECOND EXAM
(take home)

Write essays on the following three questions:

1. Compare and contrast the manners in which Locke and Cudworth develop the position that moral right and wrong are not arbitrary (as "Voluntarism" held). To what extent do you believe that they succeeded in disagreeing with Hobbes--and give your reasons for so believing.
2. The concept of conformity or fittingness plays an important role in the ethical views of Locke, Cudworth and Clarke. Compare and contrast the views of these men on that concept, and evaluate the concept as an account of moral obligation.
3. Butler says: "Take in then that authority and obligation, which is a constituent part of this reflex approbation, and it will undeniable follow, though a man should doubt of everything else, yet, that he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue; an obligation implied in the very idea of virtue, in the very idea of reflex approbation." (Melden, 237b; Raphael, I, p. 331d) Evaluate his view as expressed here, and especially how it relates to the refutation of psychological egoism.

You should be able to answer these each in 3 handwritten or double spaced pages, but you are not limited to that.

Please turn you essays in on April 4 at class.

USC School of Philosophy
 Phil. 442: History of Ethics to 1900

Study questions on Richard Price:

1. The differences which Price states as obtaining between sense or sentiment and understanding or (intuitive) reason. [Raphael, II, 134-137; Selby-Bigge, II, 109-112]
2. In what important cases does the 'understanding' originate new and simple ideas, according to Price? [R. 137-141; SB. 112-121]
3. How does Price 'prove' that reason is the source of our ideas of moral right and wrong? [R. 142-147; SB. 121ff] Four main considerations.
4. Explain the "two sources of our mental feelings" [R. 151f; SB. 137f] which are annexed to our intellectual perceptions in order to give them greater force in governing human behavior. [R. 148-152; SB. 134-139]
5. What proof does Price offer that the ideas of excellence and dignity are ideas of the understanding, as opposed to sensation? [Not in R.; SB. 144-145]
6. How does Price show that our desires and affections--for Happiness, truth, etc.--are not arbitrarily conjoined with their objects. [R. 152-154; SB. 144-145 <most not in R.>]
7. Note Price's disproof of psychological Hedonism (SB. bottom p. 145; not in R.)
8. Evaluate, in your own terms, Price's claim [SB 143] that "a mind that should think happiness not to be better than misery, would mistake as grossly, as a mind that should believe the whole not to be greater than a part. It cannot therefore be reasonably doubted, but that such a being, upon a comparison of happiness and misery, would as unavoidably as he perceives their difference, prefer the one to the other; and chuse the one rather than the other, for his fellow beings." [not in R.]
9. Explain Price's concept of merit, and why he rejects Utilitarian and reformatory accounts of reward and punishment. [R. 154-157; SB. 147-149]
10. Briefly sketch Price's account of obligation, being especially careful to state what he thinks obligation is. [R. 161-175; SB. 155-173. R omits the excellent summary of Price's view given on SB. 173-174.] Note Price's revival of 'fitness'.
11. Clarify Price's distinction between abstract and practical virtue [R. 189; SB. 175], and list the main "essentials of practical virtue" [R. 190d-195; SB. 176-181] stated by Price. [R. 189-198; SB. 175-184]
12. Note the anti-Utilitarian points on R. 155-149; SB. 147-149.

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Phil. 442

Immanuel Kant

COMMENTS ON THE READINGS IN KANT'S ETHICAL WRITINGS

You have purchased, as texts, Kant's
Lectures on Ethics (from late 1770s)
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)
Ethical Philosophy, that is, the Foundations + The
Metaphysics of Morals, Part II: "Metaphysical
Principles of Virtue" (1797)

You have the Foundations in two translations, one by James Ellington, in Ethical Philosophy, and one by Lewis White Beck, in your Ethical Theories: A Book of Readings, A. I. Melden, ed., 2nd edition, pp. 317-366. In addition you have as a "secondary" source Warner Wick's "Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy," on pp. xi-lxii of Ethical Philosophy, and also the brief section in Sidgwick's Outlines. (pp 271-278) Along with these comments I am providing a "Bibliography" of sufficient dimensions to set you well on your own as a student of Kant's ethics.

Advice on reading: One has simply to hurl oneself at the Foundations. It might be easier for some to read the Lectures on Ethics first, but I rather think one does better to try the Foundations, and then, bruised and bleeding, turn to the Lectures, which will seem "a piece of cake." The Lectures will prove much easier to read if you start at the back and read forward section by section, at least to p. 171. You will find these sections quite interesting and intelligible. You might then read from the back of Ethical Philosophy down to p. 145. Then read pp. 71-171 of the Lectures, followed by pp. 77-141 of "Metaphysical Principles of Virtue," in Ethical Philosophy. Then read the Lectures, pp. 1-71, and pp. 3-73 of the "Metaphysical Principles of Virtue." Finally, go back and read the Foundations. This will soon prove to be quite repetitive, and you will begin to see the rather simple structure of Kant's theory. In the Lectures pp. 71-253, and pp. 77-161 of the "Metaphysical Principles of Virtue," Kant is clear, concrete, lively and inspiring, and you will get a glimpse of a moral world that glistens with the sublimity that captivated Kant's contemporaries. (See L. W. Beck's "Forward" to the Lectures.)

At some point, give yourself an intellectual and spiritual treat and just read the Lectures straight through. Of special importance for understanding Kant's theory are pp. 1-19, 29-46, 71-78, 117-134, 171-176. But the various special topics dealt with are treasures of ethical reflection which you really won't want to miss. Don't worry about the many Latin phrases, taken from Baumgarten's text that Kant used for his course. Usually you will be able to pick up the sense from the context. Also, the views expressed in these Lectures are substantially those Kant held at the end of his life. The only major difference is the use of "transcendental" argument in his later works.

Perhaps the most important question in modern and contemporary ethics and philosophy is expressed in Hume's words:

"What is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the record of our memory." (Section IV of Hume's Enquiry)

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Immanuel Kant reacts against empiricism and sentimentalism, and appeals to reason. But not as a planning device. Its task is not to make men happy. For that it is incompetent. (Melden 323, 337-338) Its role is to make us good, to develop in us a good will. (323)

Good will the only unconditioned value (321f), "not...the sole and complete good but the highest good and the condition of all others, even of the desire for happiness." (323) Man must aim, not to be happy, for that is too indefinite a concept to guide action. (337) He must aim to be worthy of happiness. (357)

The good will is one which is governed by duty (324-5, 351), which is just the constraint of respect for law upon our actions (226-327n). This constraint imposes categorical imperatives that are universal (339-40), motivates respect for persons (344-345), and makes freedom possible. (348-349, 355-6, 359-60) (See important summary in paragraph spanning 349-50.)

What human dignity is, for Kant: Rationality in his special ontological sense. (351) Kant's utter otherworldliness.

Here insert the two pages outlining the argument in "Foundations"

Lecture notes on Kant's Metaphysics of Morals

1. The foundation for a metaphysical of morals consists in the combined 'metaphysical' and 'transcendental' deductions provided in Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals or 1785 (English translations in Melden, pp. 318-366 and Ellington pp. 1-62).

The 'foundation' has the task of showing (metaphysical deduction) what it is that determines a good will--namely, the concept of law--and (transcendental deduction) how that determination is possible--namely, through the constraint of respect that permits autonomy.

2. The metaphysics of morals deals with the non-physical or supersensuous ('intelligible') element in the rightness of an action (its conformity to law) and in the praiseworthiness of an action (its determination by love of duty or respect). The former is the metaphysical doctrine of right, while the latter is the metaphysical doctrine or elements of virtue. Legislation may not be ethical. "That legislation which makes an action a duty and at the same time makes this duty the incentive is ethical." (p. 18) "The mere agreement or disagreement of an action with the law, without regard to the incentive of the action, is called legality; but when the idea of duty arising from the law is at the same time the incentive of the action, then the agreement is called the morality of the action." (p. 18) Legislation is ethical only if the external constraint attached to performance might be absent and "the idea of duty alone would still be sufficient as an incentive." (p. 19) "The doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue [Rechtslehre und Tugendlehre] are distinguished, therefore, not so much by their different duties as by the difference in the legislation which connects the one or the other incentive with the law." (19-20) Study case top p. 20. Cp. mid p. 39 and p. 47.

"The doctrine of right has to do merely with the formal conditions of external freedom (consistency with itself when its maxim is made into a universal law), i.e., right." (p. 37) Ends, by contrast, must be self-chosen, i.e. freely, and cannot, therefore be contained in the doctrine of right. (p. 38) So ethics is a doctrine of ends, and hence a doctrine of virtue. (38-39)

3. SO, WE MAY SAY, THE METAPHYSICS OF VIRTUE DEALS WITH THE INTERNAL CAUSATION OF MORALLY PRAISEWORTHY ACTIONS.

This 'causation' involves "a pleasure preceded by law." (34f)

And hence ends which give pleasure--moral pleasure.

pp. 34, 58, 37-38

4. Simply, THE VIRTUOUS PERSON IS ONE WHO TAKES DUTY AS AN END, WHO DESIRES TO DO HER DUTY, TAKES PLEASURE IN IT. pp. 53-54

"Virtue is the strength of man's maxim in obeying his duty." (p. 53; cp. 54, 56, 64.

Virtue as self-control and 'apathy'. (67-68)

5. So, now, what are our duties which are to be our ends?
 - A. Ones own moral perfection.
 - B. The happiness of others. (pp. 43-45, 50-53)
Study chart on p. 57!
6. On moral feeling and conscience. pp. 58-59

ILLUSTRATIONS:

7. What one's duty to oneself consists in. Bot. p. 80-81
 - A. As animal 81ff
 - E. g. Suicide 83
 "self-abuse" 85-86
 Gluttony 88
 - B. As a moral being 90ff
 - E. G. Lying 90
 Avarice 93
 Servility 96
8. What one's duty to others consists in 112 ff
 the required feelings
 - E. g. gratitude 119
 pride 130
 mockery 132
 friendship. 135
 the 'social' virtues 140
9. The 'didactics' of ethics. How ethics is to be taught 145ff
 Bits of a "moral catechism"
10. Moral ascetics or hardiness. 154f
11. God/man relations do not fall within ethics. 161

Phil. 442

Immanuel Kant

STUDY QUESTIONS ON THE FOUNDATIONS (in Melden, Ethical Theories):

1. How does "the common idea of duty and moral laws" (319b) prove that there must be "a pure moral philosophy which is completely freed from everything that may be only empirical"? (318-321)
2. Expand the argument given for the first sentence of the "First Section" on p. 321--that is, state separately the main parts of the argument--and especially clarify the relation of the good will to utility or "fruitfulness." (321-323)
3. List the main stages through which Kant moves as he sets out to "develop the concept of a will which is to be esteemed as good of itself, without regard to anything else." (324-227b)
4. Explain what Kant means by "duty." (326a & 328b: In the course of doing so you must discuss the concept of respect (Achtung).
5. What is the meaning of: "Thus my maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law." (328a)
6. Explain the reasoning referred back to in the following statement: "From what has been said it is clear that all moral concepts have their seat and origin entirely a priori in reason." (333a)
7. Explain the major concepts in the following statement about imperatives: "Therefore imperatives are only formulas expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, e.g., the human will." (334c)
8. What is the difference between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative (335a and following); and, among the former, how do "rules of skill" differ from "counsels of prudence"? (336c)
9. The problem of an imperative's "possibility" in Kant is not a problem of whether or not it is possible; but, given that it is actual, what is it that makes it possible? Now the "possibility" of a categorical imperative is shown on 360, and we will come to that later. But how are hypothetical imperatives "possible"? (337-338)
10. Carefully state the reason which Kant gives to show that "If I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it contains." (339c-d)
11. Following are five different formulas of "the one" categorical imperative--and there is, according to Kant, only one categorical imperative (see 339d and 354d). Prepare to explain the meanings of these formulas:

- a) "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (339d)
- b) "Act as though the maxim of your action were by your (act of) will to become a universal law of nature." (340a)
- c) "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." (345a)
- d) Act only upon "the idea of the will of every rational being as making universal law." (346b)
- e) "The rational being must regard himself always as legislative in a realm of ends possible through the freedom of will." (347d)

12. Carefully examine the four case studies on pages 340-341 and 345 in terms of how the principle of universal law and the principle of personality, respectively, apply to them.

13. Kant seems to suppose that all of his formulas are equivalent. Can you see how the principles of personality and of free legislation (autonomy) could be logically derived from the principle of universal law?

14. Define "autonomy" and "heteronomy" and explain their significance for Kant's theory of morality. (347ff)

15. Explain how Kant comes to identify the free will with the will under moral law. (355) Can he then also hold that the person who acts immorally acts freely? How could he?

16. Explain how the concept of freedom unites that of human will to the concept of a rational and hence autonomous being, and thereby makes a categorical imperative possible. (359-361) This is Kant's "transcendental deduction" of the categorical imperative from freedom.

17. Schiller attempted to criticize Kant's theory of duty in the following verse:

"Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure.

Hence I am plagued with doubt whether I am a virtuous person."

Now the allegedly 'Kantian' remedy is offered ---

"Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely,

And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you."

Is Kant committed by his theory to suggesting this remedy? What in his writings could suggest such an idea? (See the remarks on "moral pleasure" in Ethical Philosophy pp. 34 & 58, and the distinction between "coquettish" and "morose" ethics in Lectures, pp. 75-78)

For help in deciphering the text of the Foundations, see the section entitled "Analysis of the Argument" (pp. 13-54) in H. J. Paton's The Moral Law, as well as his commentary, The Categorical Imperative. Both books are on reserve.

Study questions for the Hobbes readings:

1. What does "good" mean for Hobbes? In what sense is it "egoistic" and in what sense "relative"? From its relativity does it follow that it is variable from person to person? Or that it is arbitrary? (Melden, pp. 219-220; Raphael, British Moralists, I, pp. 4-5)
2. What connection does Hobbes see HONOR to have with POWER and JUSTICE? (Raphael, I, pp. 28-32; Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, II, pp. 286-287)
3. Explain how FELICITY or HAPPINESS, not being something one can attain, leads to the struggle for POWER, and what (four) desires and fears lead one to obey a common power. (Raphael, pp. 32-34; Selby-Bigge, pp. 288-289; Melden, pp. 221-224)
4. What does Hobbes mean by WAR? (Raphael, p. 36; Selby-Bigge, p. 291; Melden, p. 223) Why are all actions "just" in the state of war, and how does REASON contribute to establishment of PEACE? (Raphael 38; Selby-Bigge 293; Melden 224)
5. Explain the relationship that exists between the jus naturale and the lex naturale on Hobbes' view, especially insofar as it involves REASON, SELF-PRESERVATION, and LIBERTY. (Raphael 38-40; Selby-Bigge 293-295; Melden 224-226) Can Hobbes succeed in making the obligation in foro interno (Raphael 50; Melden 230) of Natural Laws consistent with the "liberty" which one exercises in disobeying them?
6. How can the 3rd "Law of Nature" be derived from the 1st "Law of Nature"? Hobbes says it can be. Can it?
7. How does Hobbes show (?) that the existence of PITY, LAUGHTER (or amusement), and CHARITY (good will or love) do not contradict his thesis of psychological egoism; and that, contrary to what they may suggest, man is not pleased at the benefit of any other man, except insofar as it also is his own benefit? (Raphael 9-12; Selby-Bigge 298-299)
8. What is the rationale that Mandeville offers for his claim that "the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride." (Raphael 234; Selby-Bigge 353)

Study questions for Cudworth and Locke readings.

CUDWORTH:

1. State the main points of Cudworth's argument (against Voluntarism/Hobbes) to the conclusion that "...nothing is morally good or evil, just or unjust by mere will without nature..." (Raphael I, pp. 106-112; Selby-Bigge II, pp. 247-253)
2. Explain Cudworth's view of the relations between a). "...Things called naturally good and due..." and b). "...those things...called positively good and due..." (Raphael 110-112; Selby-Bigge 252-253)
3. Summarize Cudworth's reply to (Descartes' version of) Voluntarism. (Raphael 112-114; Selby-Bigge 254-257)

LOCKE:

1. Explain Locke's view of the relation of good and evil to pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and to happiness and misery on the other. (Raphael I, 141-2, 152-3, 156; Selby-Bigge II, 331, 338, 340, 344)
2. State Locke's analysis of the idea of LIBERTY (Raphael 143-4; Selby-Bigge 332-3), stressing how liberty presupposes UNDERSTANDING (R 144; S 333), and how it relates and does not relate to WILL. (R 145-6; S 335)
3. Explain how the "greatest good" or "real happiness" does not always, on Locke's view, move the will, and yet serves as the foundation of all liberty. (R 152-155; S 339f & 342f)
4. What is Locke's view of how men know "of the rectitude or pravity of their actions...." and how does this how give rise to three classes of rights and wrongs? (R 155-159; S 344-347)

Phil. 442: History of Ethics to 1900:

Questions to guide preparation of the Samuel Clarke Readings:

1. What are the main points in Clarke's argument for the proposition that what men ought to do is specified solely by "certain necessary and eternal differences of things, and certain consequent fitnesses or unfitnesses of the application of different things or different relations one to another,..." (Raphael, British Moralists, I, pp. 191-198; Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, II, pp. 4-11)
2. What are the main points of Clarke's argument for the proposition that "the mind of man cannot avoid giving its assent to the eternal law of righteousness,...and also that this assent is a formal obligation upon every man, actually and constantly to conform himself to that..." eternal law. (R 198-207; S 11-22)
3. What is Clarke's three-fold division of "...the several duties of morality or natural religion..." List some of the more important obligations which fall into the divisions. (R 207-212; S 22-29)
4. Outline Clarke's proof that the Law of Nature is anterior both to positive acts of God's will and to whatever sanctions may be attached to that Law." (R 213-217; S 31-37)
5. How does Clarke purport to prove that Hobbes was in error in his position on the foundations of moral obligation? (R 217-225; S 37-51)
6. What is Clarke's argument(s) that the eternal moral obligations which are in force because of the nature of things also express the will of God, or are positively required by God's intent? (S 51-56; not in R)

Phil. 442: History of Ethics to 1900

Questions to guide preparation on the Butler readings:

Prepare brief written answers if possible:

1. Explain Butler's concept of a 'system' or 'constitution', and the relation of this concept to that ancient precept, 'reverence thyself'. (Melden, 233-237 but also 241 & 255f; Raphael I 325-31, 337-39, 356f)

2. Carefully distinguish self-love from what Butler calls the 'particular affections', and explain why he holds there to be no necessary conflict of self-love with benevolence (H 262; R 370) , and why it does not follow from the fact that agent A desires x that x is in A's interest. (M 238-241; R 332-336; and elsewhere)

3. What are the three separate proofs which Butler brings to show that men are by nature as much concerned about the good of others as of their own? (M 241c; R 337f, but especially see footnotes #5 and #6 as well). Note: Here Butler hopes to disprove psychological egoism. See also the important arguments on p. 268 (of M) and 379-381 (of R)

4. What source does Butler find for "the many miseries. which men are the authors and instruments of to each other"? (M 246b; R343)

5. How does Butler distinguish 'following nature' from 'doing as one pleases' (M 250; R 350), and how may a rash action destructive of the agent be called 'unnatural'? (M 252-3; R 352f)

6. By what argumentation does Butler arrive at the conclusion that "Self-love then, though confined to the interest of the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one and the same course of life." (M 257d; R 360)

7. Explain and evaluate the following argument (against psychological hedonism): "That all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them, is manifested from hence, that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion; there could be no enjoyment or delight for one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another." (M 259; R 365)

8. Explain how 'happiness' is related to self-love, and how 'love of neighbor' (M 264d; R 371) is related to the particular affections, (M 261-266; R 368-373)

On Egoism, be sure to study at some point C. D. Broad's essay, "Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives," in his Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy.

After Hobbes: Notes to guide lecture/study

Phil. 442

Four main points in Hobbes' view were repeatedly discussed after him:

1. His psychological egoism: the view that we are only motivated by what we take to be in our own interest. We never intentionally act to advance the interest of others without regard to our own interest. (See definitions of "good" and "evil" on Raphael I, pp. 4-5, 21-22, and the discussion of "charity," p. 12. See Sidgwick, Outlines, p. 164) Egotism is treated as the natural condition of humanity. (See Mandeville's statement, pp. 234-235)
2. His ethical egoism: the view that we ought to act only in our own interest. (See definition of lex naturalis, Raphael I, p. 39; and Sidgwick, pp. 165ff)
3. His (or allegedly his) voluntarism: the view that it is possible for "mere will" (Raphael I, 108) of God or the sovereign, to create a moral distinction, or to make an action morally obligatory that is not so because of its inherent nature. (See Raphael I, pp. 38, mid-39, 59-60, 72; yet see 377 on p. 50. See Clarke's critique, 224-225)
4. His relativism, which follows logically from points 1 - 3.

THE TWO MAIN LINES OF RESPONSE TO HOBBS:

A. The Platonic/Rationalistic/Metaphysical, which concentrated more on his ethical egoism, voluntarism and relativism. Here fall:

Cumberland
Cudworth
S. Clarke
Balguy
R. Price
T. Reid
I. Kant
G. E. Moore

B. The Empirical/Psychological/Phenomenological, which concentrated more on the description of our experience in moral contexts, and finds against psychological egoism, usually--not always--through some form of "moral sense" theory (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume) or of hedonistic utilitarianism (Locke, Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick). Here fall:

Locke
Shaftesbury
Butler
Hutcheson
Hume

A. Smith
 Bentham
 J. S. Mill
 Sidgwick
 Nietzsche

There are various reasons why some of these thinkers might be on both lists, but their main contributions seem to me to justify the association indicated. You will find it illuminating to read the long "Introduction" to Selby-Bigge's British Moralists at this point of the course, and Sidgwick's Outlines, pp. 170-235).

Egoism takes such a pounding at the hands of these thinkers that it does not return as a serious theory of morals until the mid-20th century.

Especially important passages to study in the literature assigned are:
Cumberland:

The meaning of "natural law," Raphael I, 79; cf. 93-94.

Note the independence of civil laws and compacts.

Why the common good is the supreme law, pp. 81-82

Anti-Egoism, p. 87, 98-99

Argument against Egoism from "consistency" 99-100
 cf. 102.

Cudworth:

Argument that moral good and evil etc "cannot possibly be arbitrary things" (p. 106-107)

The objection from positive commands (108)

Refuted (108-109)

Again: The qualified commander (110-111)

Moral good and evil depend on the nature of the soul.
 (117-118)

A Proof of some cases of freedom (against Hobbes) 122f.

How the human is "self-made" (132-133)

Locke:

The union of virtue and public happiness. Raphael I, p. 140

The nature of good and evil. p. 141, 152, 156 (Is this hedonism?)

What the Will and liberty are. pp. 144, 146

What determines the will. 149, 150-151, 153

Pleasure and happiness. 152

The "pursuit of happiness" depends upon our power to suspend desire by means of reason. 153-154

Morally good and evil as conformity to law. 156

Three kinds of laws. 156-158

Is this "rule utilitarianism"?

Morality as demonstrative science. 159

Empiricist proof of natural law and law-giver 162-165
 and of the three parts of duty. 165-166

S. Clarke:

That it is eternal relations of fitness that impose actions as duties or obligations, without regard to commands or personal benefit. Raphael I, p. 192-193.

A reductio of the view that "there be no such thing as good and evil in the nature of things." p. 196

The two sole causes of irrational (including immoral) behavior. 199-200

What obligation is. 202

The three classes of duties. 207-212

The "law of nature" what. 212

Does not rest on God's positive will. 213

Why rewards and punishment are necessary. 214-216

Criticisms of Hobbes specifically. 217-225

HISTORY OF ETHICS TO 1900
MATERIAL FROM PREVIOUS YEARS:

HISTORY OF ETHICS TO 1900

USC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
Philosophy 442
History of Ethics to 1900

Spring 1998
6:30-9:00PM Tues, Mudd Hall of Philosophy 106
Instructor: Dallas Willard

A. This is a course in the History of Philosophical Ethics, and has as its main object to familiarize the student thoroughly with most of the main arguments and analyses concerning ethical issues advanced by Western moral philosophers up to 1900. Because of the vast area to be covered, there will be a large amount of reading to be done, most of it in primary sources. But the passages to be concentrated upon are more manageable in the time we have available. These are the ones that will be dealt with in the meetings of the class. At the meetings there will usually be stated or distributed study questions and/or outlines bearing upon the reading to be done for the next class meeting. Responses to these should be carefully prepared for that next meeting.

The student might best approach this course as a "Great Books" or "Great Authors" study, where the primary task is to understand the ethical views of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hobbes, Butler, Hume, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, along with a number of lesser figures. From the lecturer's point of view, the material of the course is viewed as a dialectical stream proceeding from Pre-Socratic Greece to the England of 1900, in which the recurring antitheses are: The Good as something specifically human (Protagoras, Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Mill) and The Good as something transcendental to human nature (Plato, Clark, Price, Kant, and--in the early 20th Century--G. E. Moore).

B. The formal requirements of the course are:--two take home examinations, and a two-hour final. Several one-page "thought papers" or "precis" will be assigned. Graduate students must, in addition, prepare a critical essay--not a research paper--on a central topic in either Plato, Aristotle, Kant or Hume. This essay is due at 7 pm on May 5, but must be discussed with the instructor by April 14th, and a preliminary draft/outline submitted by April 21th. The final exam presupposes a detailed knowledge of texts read from Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, as well as all of the material studied after the 2nd mid-term. Two thirds of the final will be on these three authors. Class attendance, preparedness for recitation, and regular participation in the class discussions are expected from all members of the class.

If the class is over 25 in number, a precis will be required every two weeks, and the week after each one is due one-hour discussion sections will be arranged--most likely one the hour before the lecture on Tuesday and one the hour after, to fit everyone in. Attendance at

these will be required. Anyone with a grade of "A" (not "A-") on all precis after the first one will be excused from the final (assigned an "A" for it).

C. TEXTS:

1. Plato, The Republic (R. Larson translation)
2. Sidgwick, Henry, Outlines of the History of Ethics>
3. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics
4. Melden, A. I., Ethical Theories
5. Frankena, Ethics
6. D. D. Raphael, British Moralists, two volumes
& Numerous photocopy handouts.

On reserve for your inspection and use: Selby-Bigge, L. A., ed., British Moralists, two volumes; J. B. Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: An Anthology; and A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics.

Of these texts, the Frankena Ethics and the Sidgwick Outlines are to be read as soon and with as much continuity as is possible. Try to read them the first week of the semester or so, and then re-read Outlines with the other texts, on the schedule given below.

D. Schedule of Assigned Readings and Examinations:

1st week: Jan 12-16--At 1st class meeting (Jan 13), discussion of the Course. The nature of philosophical work in relation to historical studies. Pre-philosophical ethics (see pages 95-121 of C. S. Lewis, Abolition of Man along with Asoka, The Edicts of Asoka <both on reserve>) and the move to philosophy (Melden pp. 1-19 and MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics <hereafter "ASHOE," on reserve> 1-25). What in life calls for ethical thought? What is ethical theory? The heart of Plato's theory in the Republic (Melden, pp. 52-61). Larson translation: Books II - V (pp. 31-146)

Precis #1 due Jan 20: Plato, Republic (Larson pp. 22-30 <compare Melden, pp. 38b-44b>)

2nd week: Jan 19-23--Plato. Read Melden 21-87; Sidgwick 14-51; Larson translation, pp. 163-251 <suggested: ASHOE 26-50>>

3rd week: Jan 26-30--Plato/Aristotle. Read Melden 88-142 <suggested: ASHOE 51-109>

Precis #2 due Feb 3: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, ch. 5 (Melden, pp. 105-107b)

4th week: Feb 2-6--Aristotle. Melden 164-187; Sidgwick 51-90, 109-136 <suggested: ASHOE 110-120>

5th week: Feb 9-13--Melden, pp. 189-231 and Raphael, Vol. I, pp. 1-76, Sidgwick 136-170; ASHOE 121-145

Precis #3 due Feb 17: Cudworth against Hobbes, pp. 105-top 112 of Raphael (ed), British Moralists, Vol. I.

6th week: Feb 16-20--On Cumberland/Cudworth /Locke/Clarke. Raphael, Vol I, 79-166 & 191-236 <or: Selby-Bigge II 247-266, 326-347, 3-56> Sidgwick 170-184. Strongly recommended secondary source: Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought: 1640-1740.

---TAKE HOME EXAM HANDED OUT On Feb. 17---

Due at class on 24th

7th week: Feb 23-27--Hume. Melden 273-316 & Raphael, Vol II, 3-111; Sidgwick 184-212 <suggested: ASHOE 146-177>

Precis #4 due March 3: Hume on origin of morals in sentiment.

Selection from the Treatise, Raphael, II, pp. 3-7, 17-19 .

<cf. Melden pp. 273- 276>

8th week: Mar 2-6--Hume continued. Sidgwick 213-236. On Adam Smith/Richard Price. Raphael, Vol II, 131-198, 201-224, & 231-247 <or: Selby-Bigge II, 105-184>

-----Spring Recess, Mar 9-13-----

9th week: Mar 16-20--Continuation on Smith and Price. Kant. Melden 318-366 {A different translation of this selection is in Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy, pp. 1-69. You will find it extremely helpful to compare these translations}; Sidgwick 270-277 <suggested: ASHOE 178-198>

Precis #5 due Mar 24: Kant on what makes the Good Will possible. Melden pp. 321d-326 + notes #3 and #4 on p. 326-7.

---TAKE HOME EXAM HANDED OUT ON MARCH 24---

Due at class on Mar 31

10th week: Mar 23--27--Kant continued. Mill and Hedonistic Utilitarianism. Melden 391-414

11th week: Mar 30-Apr 3--Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp.1-14, 23-56, 77-115.

Precis #6 due April 7: Mill's "proof of the principle of utility" (Melden pp. 414b-417a)

12th week: Apr 6-10--Methods of Ethics, 119-216 & 337-390

13th week: Apr 13-17--Methods of Ethics, 411-509

Bradley, "My Station and Its Duties," Melden pp. 450-481

Precis #7 due April 21, topic to be determined.

14th week: 20-24--Methods of Ethics (concluded). The Nietzsche phenomena. Relapse to Intuitionism. A glance at ethical theory in the 20th Century. Where we stand today. Read Melden 435-449 and 515-525, Sidgwick 285-337. The MacIntyre thesis. <suggested: ASHOE 215-248>

15th week: Last class meeting on Apr. 28th. Classes started on Wed. and ended on Mon. We got cheated by the calendar of one class meeting. So let's use "stop day" to get our money's worth. No readings beyond those already assigned. Clean up and review time.

Final Exam: 7-9PM, Tuesday May 5 (Commencement Fri. May 8)

Phil. 442, History of Ethics to 1900
Spring 1993

Second exam

1. Explain the egoism and the voluntarism which emerges or seems to emerge in Hobbes' ethical theory, and some significant responses to each of them by subsequent philosophers. You may wish to use the handout, "After Hobbes," to orient your discussion, but be sure to integrate Hume's views into the discussion.

2. Explain Hume's position on the place of reason in the moral life, and how Kant responds to it.

The exam is open book and open notes (handouts and notes take by you in class). ON YOUR HONOR, DO YOUR OWN WORK. We can briefly discuss problems you are having in developing your answers at the class meeting of April 12.

The first thing you should do in approaching this test is to read it carefully and determine its parts. Then review your class notes with reference to it.

The exam is due at opening of class on April 19th. It will be returned to you at the final exam on May 3.

Dallas Willard

Study questions for final exam, Phil. 442, Spring 1993:

1. Compare and contrast the role(s) of happiness and/or pleasure in the ethical theories of Aristotle, Kant and J. S. Mill.
2. Explain the relationship between the 'mean' and the specifically human function for Aristotle.
3. What is a metaphysics of morals for Kant, and in what way is the 'metaphysical' in his special sense a condition of the possibility of autonomy and of a good will?
4. Provide a critical exposition of Mill's argument ('proof') for "the utilitarian doctrine that happiness [pleasure?!?] is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end;..." (Melden p. 414)
5. Explain and evaluate Mill's view that "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." (Melden p. 397) Can he defend qualitative differences in pleasures--i.e. that of two pleasures one may be equal to or weaker than the other but still better, or of more value than it?
6. Explain Moore's "open question" argument and what he calls the "naturalistic fallacy." Contrast the latter with Hume's claim that one cannot deduce ought from is.
7. Discuss the developments in the theory of knowledge and in political history (egalitarianism) that placed a hedonistic theory of value and life, such as Bentham and Mill's, in such a favorable light as it has enjoyed in the 19th and 20th centuries.
8. Utilizing the concept of virtue and virtues explained on pp. 191 and 219, along with the concepts of internal goods and practices explained on pp. 187-196, do you agree with MacIntyre's account of what has happened to render 'morality' largely powerless and unintelligible in our time? Why or why not? Especially, do you regard it as justified by the study of the history of ethical theories?

Test will be open book, no notes.

Test date; 7-9 PM, May 3, 1993

Final exam in Phil. 442, Spring 1994

Take home/open books, no notes--

1. Explain and contrast the role of pleasure or happiness in the ethical theories of Aristotle, Kant and Mill.
2. What is reason, and how does it relate to the views of Aristotle and Kant concerning moral virtue. (Be sure to contrast the mean to the categorical imperative with respect to how reason works.)
3. Locate Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism in the context of "epistemology driven ethical theory." Be sure to discuss the meaning of his "principle of utility" (395 Melden) and the proof of the same (414f), along with the claim that pleasures differ in quality as well as quality.
4. Explain Nietzsche's theory of value and MacIntyre's view of virtue, with special reference to the role of history in producing and sustaining moral distinctions. Are they both nihilists?

Turn the exam in at 11:00 AM, Monday May 9, my office. (MHP 205)
With the attached Micky-Mouse assignment in Sidgwick.

Home phone no.: 818-716-0652
D. Willard

Final exam in Phil. 442, Spring 1998

Take home/open books, no notes--

1. Discuss Mill's inability to offer a proof for hedonistic utilitarianism (see Melden pp. 414ff and Sidgwick, Methods, pp. 386ff) and compare it with Sidgwick's "Proof of Utilitarianism." (418ff)
2. What does Sidgwick understand by a "Method" of ethics (pp. 1-8), and how does he make moral reasoning the ultimate court of appeal in ethical theory? Illustrate the latter by reference to his treatment of Egoistic Hedonism (Bk II) and Intuitionism (Bk III). See his summary of results of examination of the Morality of Common Sense on pp. 343-361.
3. Is it your considered view that the principles of Philosophical Intuitionism as laid out by Sidgwick (pp. 373ff) meet his own stated condition that "these general formulae possess the characteristics by which self-evident truths are distinguished from mere opinions." (p. 338; pp. 338-342)
4. In what sense is Sidgwick an intuitionist both in his analysis of the moral judgment itself (Book I, chapter III) and in the axioms upon which moral reasoning is based (Book III, chapter XIII)?
5. What is reason, and how does it relate to the views of Aristotle and Kant concerning moral virtue. (Be sure to contrast the mean to the categorical imperative with respect to how reason works.)
6. Discuss the relationship between God and natural law in the history of ethical theory.
7. At the outset of the course it was pointed out that an ethical theory always depends upon some view of the essential parts and properties of human beings. In the light of what you have now studied, give reason to think this is true (or not), and relate this claim the Anscombe's thesis in her paper "Modern Moral Philosophy."

Write on nos. 2, 5, 6, 7 and one of 1, 3, 4. We will go over any questions you have about the questions at our last meeting on April 28.

Turn your exams in to me by noon May 6, my office.

From Hume on Ethics is Epistemology Driven.

Hume:

"...It is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses." (p. 147)

"...We can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment,..." (p. 155)

"Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion." (p. 155)

These quotations are from Section V of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Page numbers refer to the C. W. Hendel, ed., Hume Selections. The application of these statements in their locus is to 'necessary connexion' or causation. But they are to be taken in complete generality.

Now if sensation or "feeling" is taken as the indicator of the boundaries of knowledge and of what exists, then certain important areas of reality and knowledge, as presupposed in ordinary human life, are omitted or severely called into question. These are mainly:

1. Moral (and other) values
2. Whole material objects (chairs, trees, blades of grass)
3. Minds (mine, yours, God, disembodied)
4. Past and future events.
5. Theoretical entities: atoms, unconscious drives or thoughts
6. Classes, and relations of class membership, inclusion, e.g. the class of fractions contains irrational numbers, or the class of U. S. Citizens contains Tibetans, etc.
7. Universals and relations of universals,
 - e.g. Blue
 - Blue is a color
 - 4 is the square of 2
 - The double of the area of a square is the square of its diagonal
8. etc.?

Mill:

HEDONISTIC UTILITARIANISM
JEREMY BENTHAM AND JOHN STUART MILL

Hedonistic Utilitarianism reverts to the view that reason can determine which individual or social/political policies and actions will bring happiness. According to Bentham the principle of utility would found "that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law." (Melden p. 368)

Hedonism as a psychological and as an ethical theory. (Melden 367, 388, 395)

Utility and the principle of utility, the meaning of "good" & "evil" (368)

Action's "conformity to utility" (369); "ought," "right," & "wrong" (370)

A proof of the principle of utility "at once unnecessary & impossible" (370)

Pain or pleasure comes from four sources: physical, political, moral and religious (382-3)

The 7 factors relevant in calculating the amount of pleasure/pain a given action involves. (385-387)

Motives never intrinsically good or bad, but only instrumentally so (388)

J. St. Mill attempts a proof, in "a larger meaning of the word 'proof'" (294), that pleasure ("happiness") is good and the only good--"the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end." (414-15; proof summarized in 1st full parag. 417)

The mental law of "association" allows means to happiness to become a part or it and desired for their own sake (415-16)

Happiness what? (395c, 399d)

Why not egoism? (398d)

Morality what? (399a-b)

Pleasures not all the same in quality and value (396-7)

Justice and utility (418ff)

5 types of examples of justice/injustice (420-1)

Summary of the components of the idea of justice (426c)

What it is "to have a right" (427b), and how based on utility (427b-c)

Justice as the chief part of morality (431a)

One person's happiness is of no greater value than any other person's.

(432-3)

Questions:

Have you ever desired pleasure, just pleasure? Describe a case?

Could happiness and pleasure be the same thing?

Why would Bentham hold that "natural rights" are "non-sense on stilts"?

Is the only difference between eating a small pig for dinner and eating a small child the total amount of pleasure which results?

(Swift's Modest Proposal for relief of the famine in Ireland.)

Should an abortion be performed in a case where slightly more pleasure would accrue to everyone involved if it is?

Classicism vs. Romanticism:

Classicism stresses the priority of form, of the universal, of the class determining universals or characteristics. It suppresses the radically individualistic, the unbounded, the emotions. Its logic is Aristotelian, symbolic, mathematical, depending upon things being what they are, not what they are not. The Enlightenment view of man and reason is an expression of Classicism, as is most of the reasoning that went into "classical" and modified Liberalism (social and political)--though so-called "liberal democracy" has increasingly attempted to incorporate ideas which essentially derive from post-Enlightenment themes.

Romanticism stresses the priority of matter, of the particular, of the idiosyncratic, even the quirky and weird, the heroic, the genius-like. (Note the characterization of the romantic bottom page 395 of Randall, and study chapter 45 of Harrison/Sullivan/Sherman.) Romanticism values feeling and faith over reason as a guide to life. Rousseau more than anyone else in Western history is the source of romanticism. Hegel attempts to redefine reason away from classicism, and after Rousseau he is the great optimistic romantic.

Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and 20th century Existentialism are pessimistic or nihilistic romantics. THEY TAKE HUMAN BEINGS TO BE WITHOUT HARMONIOUS VALUES, AND IN A POSITION WHERE THEY MUST LIVE FROM THE ASSERTIONS OF THEIR OWN WILL, WHICH ITSELF IS HIGHLY AMBIGUOUS AND UNRATIONALIZABLE. THEY DO NOT THINK OF WELL-BEING OR SCARCITY IN ANY TERMS RECOGNIZABLE IN TRADITIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC TERMS, AND REGARD LIVING FOR HAPPINESS OR PLEASURE (BENTHAM, J. ST. MILL AS THE WORLD VIEW OF THE PIG. IF THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE FOR THEM IT IS AUTHENTICITY, OR FULLY ACCEPTING AND LIVING OUT WHAT YOU AS AN INDIVIDUAL ARE, WITH AN AWARENESS THAT YOU ARE NOT EVEN CAPABLE OF THAT. (See the discussion of "self-deception" or "bad faith" in Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, pp. 299ff) and the 3 classes of people (p. 366)

Historicism (Nietzsche) is another response to empiricism. The

values that function at any point in time are simply the result of historical forces that cause them to be dominant.

And finally Linguisticism (MacIntyre), the fate of the 20th century. It is finally, I believe, impossible to make this significantly different from Historicism.

The meaning of conservatism:

1. Human existence consists of personal associations. These alone are the fabric of our lives, and determine whether life is good or bad.

2. The most important spheres of personal association are: family, neighborhood, school, church, professional or occupational, and political.

These generate institutions.

3. Institutions, socially transmissible ways of acting and interacting, both form and live on in the personal associations of individuals from generation to generation. They transmit the wisdom of past human experience concerning the best framework for the conduct of the personal associations that make up life.

4. The social reality of institutions can alone restrain the stupidity, confusion, laziness, cruelty and wickedness of human beings, which is a constant in human history. Conservatives do not believe that human beings are frogs awaiting only the kiss of revolution to become princes and princesses.

5. This wisdom, though occasionally in need of correction and adaptation, lies in its totality beyond the grasp of individual feeling or thought.

Brilliant ideas for total revolution will always be substantially wrong, and if implemented they will do incalculable harm to the fabric of human existence. <By some estimates, since 1900 around 120 million human beings have died at the hands of their own government trying to effect political and social change or trying to resist it.>

6. Human experience through history teaches that society is always organized around some sort of aristocracy (acknowledged as such or not): a group with institutionalized special powers, privileges and responsibilities, whose prominence is mainly the result of historical process, not rational planning.

7. Benign institutional change occurs in a piecemeal fashion and incrementally, over, and not within, generations. Rational judgment and individual or group sentiment may play a role in this, but as a matter of fact both rational judgement and sentiment chiefly dictate to most human beings the overall conservation of existing institutions.

<Read John Elliott, Competing Philosophies, pp. 2-5; and Carl Cohen, Communism, Fascism & Democracy, pp. 433f>

Hence, Conservativism is fundamentally a philosophy of human nature and knowledge. It posits traditions with their institutions as a source of wisdom, over against individualized reason and sensation (or feeling or sentiment), and therefore seeks on the whole to conserve institutions against massive, 'visionary' change. Its deadly foe is romantic revolutionism--the idea that by acts of (individualized or collectivized) will the social scene can be remade to realize a vision of the good society which has arisen in the mind of some contemporary individual or committee.

Conservativism is not an irrationalism, but a view of how reason works: that good judgment about the conduct of human affairs is expressed in enduring practices and institutions gradually refined by reason and experience.--

"How but in custom and in ceremony
 Are innocence and beauty born?
 Ceremony's a name for the rich horn,
 And custom for the spreading laurel tree."
 (W. B. Yeats, "A Prayer for My Daughter")

Unfortunately all of this has little to do with what is usually regarded as 'Conservativism' and opposed to 'Liberalism' in the United States. (I won't mention any names.) But it has to do with you and me and how we undertake to manage our lives with a view to what is best.

So, a nest of -isms mark the epistemological domination of ethics in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Transcendentalism, Hedonism, Intuitionism (also called 'non-naturalism'), Conservativism, Historicism, and Linguisticism, all responses to the devastation of knowledge by Empiricism..

Phil. 442, USC

STUDY QUESTIONS ON THE READINGS FROM BRADLEY, SIDGWICK AND MOORE IN MELDEN, ETHICAL THEORIES: A BOOK OF READINGS, 2ND ED:

SIDGWICK:

1. Sidgwick expresses a view of the type called "intuitionistic" in the following words: "...the ordinary moral or prudential judgments which..., have some...influence on volition, cannot legitimately be interpreted as judgments respecting the present or future existence of human feelings or any facts of the sensible world; the fundamental notion represented by the word "ought" or "right", which such judgments contain expressly or by implication, being essentially different from all notions representing facts of physical or psychical experience." (Melden, pp. 483-484) Sketch the general outlines of his argument for this position.

2. Carefully state Sidgwick's arguments that when I say, "Truth ought to be spoken," I mean more than--

- a). That "The idea of truthspeaking excites in my mind a feeling of approbation or satisfaction" (484c), or
- b). That the idea of truthspeaking elicits the approbation of the society in which I live. (485b-c)

3. State Sidgwick's argument against the view that, "when we say that a man 'ought' to do anything, or that it is his 'duty' to do it, we mean that he is bound under penalties to do it; the particular penalty considered being the pain that will accrue to him directly or indirectly from the dislike of his fellow creatures." (485-486)

4. What arguments does Sidgwick advance against the identification of "I ought to do this" with "God will punish me if I do not." (487b)

5. What connection has the "intuitionism" of question #1 with the indefinability of "ought" or "right" stated at 484a-b?

6. In what way does Sidgwick suppose that "ought" can be made clearer without giving a definition of it? (489)

7. How, then, does Sidgwick finally elucidate the conflict of desire with "the faculty of moral cognition"? (490a) That is, with reason?

8. State, and discuss the logical relationships between, the principles of justice, prudence, and benevolence. (492-498)

9. What is "ultimate goodness" on Sidgwick's view, and how is it related to virtue or moral goodness? (504-514)

10. What is a "Method" of ethics on Sidgwick's view? (Methods of Ethics, pp. 1, 6 and 14) What are the three main "Methods" examined throughout the book? (pp. 7-8)

11. Explain Sidgwick's use of "the term Reason...to denote the faculty of moral cognition...." (pp. 33-34)

12. In what way does Sidgwick's entire manner of argument in Methods depend upon introspection? (pp. 25, 27, 32)

BRADLEY:

1. Explain Bradley's view of the end to be realized in moral conduct. (pp. 451-452, 458b and following, and 461-463)
2. State the theory (454a) and the fact (455b) which show, according to Bradley, that individual men as "exclusive of other selves" (454a) do not exist.
3. Explain the meaning and the evidence for Bradley's view "that to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country." (458a)
4. Evaluate Bradley's corrections designed to meet the objections which he earlier raised against the slogan: "Duty for duty's sake." (459d and following) In your opinion, do these corrections save the slogan?
5. Explain: "But 'My Station and It's Duties' holds that unless morals varied there could be no morality; that a morality which was not relative would be futile, and I should have to ask for something 'more relative than this'." (467d)
6. What is Bradley's view of how we know in particular what is right and wrong. (469ff)
7. How does Bradley spell out the relationship between rights and duties? (477ff)

G. E. MOORE:

In the Melden selections for Moore especially consider:

1. The precise respect in which Moore is interested in "good." (515-516)
2. In what sense does Moore find goodness to be indefinable? (516-518)
3. What is the "naturalistic fallacy"? (518-520)
4. Study the paragraph #13 (521b-521c) very carefully. It is one of the most important in the development of 20th Century Ethical Theory, posing the alternative for good: either simple and undefinable, complex, "or else it means nothing at all, and there is no such subject as Ethics."
5. What is the "open question" argument for the indefinability of good? (521d-522d)
6. What are Moore's objections to Naturalism? (524-525)

Final exam in Phil. 442, Spring 1994

Take home/open books, no notes--

1. Explain and contrast the role of pleasure or happiness in the ethical theories of Aristotle, Kant and Mill.
2. What is reason, and how does it relate to the views of Aristotle and Kant concerning moral virtue. (Be sure to contrast the mean to the categorical imperative with respect to how reason works.)
3. Locate Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism in the context of "epistemology driven ethical theory." Be sure to discuss the meaning of his "principle of utility" (395 Melden) and the proof of the same (414f), along with the claim that pleasures differ in quality as well as quality.
4. Explain Nietzsche's theory of value and MacIntyre's view of virtue, with special reference to the role of history in producing and sustaining moral distinctions. Are they both nihilists?

Turn the exam in at 11:00 AM, Monday May 9, my office. (MHP 205)
With the attached Micky-Mouse assignment in Sidgwick.

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D. Willard